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Firms often discourage certain categories of individuals from buying their products, in 
contrast with typical assumptions about profit maximization. This paper provides a potential 
rationale for such firm behavior: consumers seek to signal that they have “good” moral 
values to themselves and others by avoiding products popular among people with “bad” 
values. In laboratory experiments, I provide causal evidence that demand for a product is 
lower if its customer base consists of individuals with undesirable moral values. This effect 
occurs for both observable and unobservable consumption and for products that do not 
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A typical assumption in economics is that firms maximize their profits and that they do so by 
selling their products to everyone who is willing to pay their prices. However, firms’ 
reactions to product adoptions by individuals with certain moral values show that many 
companies want some types of customers not to buy their products. For example, after the 
neo-Nazi website Daily Stormer claimed Papa John’s to be the official pizza brand of the alt-
right, the company stated that “we do not want these individuals or groups to buy our pizza” 
(Washington Post, 2017).1 Firms are willing to bear substantial costs to avoid customers with 
“bad” moral values. When the clothing brand Lonsdale purposely broke with their neo-Nazi 
customers, they lost 35% of their sales volume in Germany (Handelsblatt, 2014). That firms 
strive for customers not to buy their products seems puzzling from the perspective of profit 
maximization.  
This paper provides a potential rationale for why firms try to avoid certain customers. 
Two laboratory experiments provide evidence that demand for a product is lower if the 
product’s customer base consists of individuals with undesirable characteristics (or, “types”). 
This is the case even when the product itself does not possess any inherent attributes or 
qualities that make it more or less desirable. The evidence I provide is consistent with models 
of identity signaling: Consumers signal their desirable characteristics to themselves and 
others by avoiding products popular among people with undesirable characteristics and by 
conforming to product choices of people with desirable characteristics.2 Hence, my findings 
indicate that firms can face clear incentives to purposefully shun customers with undesirable 
moral values.  
The idea that consumers signal desirable characteristics through consumption choices 
is the focus of a long-standing theoretical literature in economics, philosophy, and sociology 
(starting with Veblen, 1899/1994; Simmel, 1904/1957; Bourdieu, 1984). Such identity 
signaling models are widely applied in economics. They provide theoretical foundations for 
brand images, advertising, and identity-based consumption (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1990; Kuksov, 
																																																								
1 Several additional examples appear to demonstrate firms caring about the moral values of their customer bases. Wendy’s, 
New Balance, and Depeche Mode reacted similarly after they were claimed to be the official burgers/shoes/band of the alt-
right (Washington Post, 2017; Independent, 2017). In preemptive actions, Nike and Ben & Jerry’s publicly announced that 
they were committed to diversity, to prevent their brands from being adopted by hate groups (Washington Post, 2017). 
Designers refused to take orders from the finance industry (Bloomberg, 2019) and to dress First Lady Melania Trump 
(Glamour, 2017). Burberry dropped baseball caps from their product line and reduced the visibility of their brand pattern to 
avoid having football hooligans as customers (BBC News, 2005). Fred Perry pulled a polo shirt from the US market that 
became popular among far-right groups (CNN, 2020). 
2 Note that “desirable” and “undesirable” characteristics are not limited to moral values. Customers might seek to signal 
other characteristics such as social status, wealth, intelligence, beauty, or good taste through consumption. My first study, 




2007; Vikander, 2017) and have important implications for individual welfare and market 
outcomes. Identity signaling can result in distortions of consumption expenditures and 
poverty traps (Frank, 1985; Ireland, 1994; Moav and Neeman, 2010, 2012), Veblen goods 
(Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996), and fashion cycles (Karni and Schmeidler, 1990; 
Pesendorfer, 1995).3 In all of this work, consumers signal their characteristics through the 
type compositions of products’ customer bases. A fundamental prediction of identity 
signaling models is, therefore, that consumers care about the types of others who consume a 
product. While this earlier work extensively explores the theoretical implications of identity 
signaling, it remains an important open empirical question whether customers actually care 
about type compositions of products’ customer bases.4 
A key challenge in answering this question is to find ceteris paribus variation in the 
type composition of customer bases. Preexisting differences in type compositions likely 
reflect differences in products’ qualities and companies’ values. These differences can affect 
consumption through channels unrelated to customers’ types. Consumers might, for example, 
avoid a product because it does not satisfy their moral standards (e.g., not organic, vegan, or 
Fair Trade) or because they do not want to support companies with “bad” values. Moreover, 
changes in type compositions typically do not occur exogenously but in reaction to events 
that might change several relevant choice aspects, such as the public perception of 
companies’ values.  
This paper provides causal evidence that consumers care directly about the type 
composition of a product’s customer base, holding constant other product characteristics. I 
circumvent the above identification challenges by using laboratory experiments. I introduce 
novel experimental paradigms that do not rely on products having preexisting associations 
with certain types of consumers. Instead, such associations are created in the experiment, 
allowing me to exogenously vary the type composition of products’ customer bases. An 
important feature of my experiments is that I study demand for products that do not have 
properties that directly connect them to specific characteristics (such as having a fair-trade 
																																																								
3 Signaling models have also been proposed to explain how firms set (dynamic) prices (Rao and Schaefer, 2013), product 
lines (Friedrichsen, 2018), and visibility of products (Carbajal, Hall, and Li, 2016). 
4 Previous empirical works on identity signaling and consumption (e.g., Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov, 2009; Heffetz, 2011; 
Bursztyn et al., 2018; Friedrichsen and Engelmann, 2018) study demand for products that have properties that directly link 
them to the image to be signaled (the product’s price as a signal of wealth or its social impact as a signal of being moral). In 
all these studies, it remains unclear whether people buy (or avoid) a product because of the product’s properties or because 
of the type composition of the product’s customer base. This paper provides unambiguous evidence that consumers care 
about the type composition, holding constant properties of the product. Another key difference of my work is that I focus on 
products that do not exhibit properties that relate them directly to specific personal characteristics or identities, as is the case 




label); signals about a consumer’s characteristics emerge only through the types of customers 
who buy the product. 
To guide my empirical investigation, I introduce a simple theoretical framework 
(building on Bernheim, 1994, and Bénabou and Tirole, 2011). In the model, consumers 
possess individual characteristics that are relevant to their social image. For example, they 
may differ in terms of moral values, social status, or intelligence. Individuals have imperfect 
knowledge about others’ characteristics but can potentially receive signals through observing 
these others’ consumption. More precisely, signals emerge through the type composition of 
products’ customer bases: A consumer of a product is attributed the typical consumers’ types. 
The model predicts that demand for a product is lower if its customer base consists of 
individuals with undesirable characteristics than if its customer base consists of individuals 
with desirable characteristics. Note that this prediction generally arises from models of 
identity signaling. I do not seek to expand the above theoretical literature but rather to apply 
it to the specific contexts studied in my experiments. 
I test the predictions of the theoretical analysis in two laboratory experiments. In the 
first experiment, participants are classified into desirable and undesirable types, based on 
either their moral values or their intelligence.5 Participants then make consumption choices, 
which are subsequently revealed to observers. I create a situation in which, from the 
perspective of the observers, the customer base of one product is statistically associated with 
certain types of customers. I vary by treatment whether customers’ types are desirable or 
undesirable. If a new consumer then chooses the product, observers may potentially confuse 
her with the customer type statistically associated with the product and attribute that customer 
type to her. I then study how the desirability of customers’ types affects demand for the 
product. While the intuition behind these relationships is straightforward, the key parts of the 
process tested in my experiment are whether consumers care sufficiently about the 
association with specific customer types to favor or avoid certain products and whether they 
anticipate that their consumption choices will provide a signal about their own type.  
I find that consumers care about the moral values of others who consume a product: 
subjects’ willingness to pay for a product is statistically significantly lower if its customer 
base consists of individuals with undesirable moral values than if its customer base consists 
of individuals with desirable moral values. The effect size is 14.9% of the average price of 
the product. Net retail margins for the products used in the experiment are about 5% 
																																																								
5 I chose these characteristics as they are related to identity and have been successfully used previously to induce image 




(Damodaran, 2019), suggesting that product adoption by individuals with undesirable 
characteristics could have non-negligible consequences for the profitability of products and 
brands. Surprisingly, I find no treatment effect for intelligence. 6  This second result 
demonstrates that there are limits to the extent to which customers care about other 
customers’ characteristics. Taken together, these findings suggest that subjects care more 
about the public perception of their moral values than about the public perception of their 
intelligence. This might explain why most examples of firms avoiding customers come from 
the domain of moral values.7  
While many products are consumed in public (e.g., apparel), products are also often 
consumed in more anonymous settings than the ones investigated in my first study (e.g., food 
delivery). Can identity signaling also affect demand for unobservable consumption, or is 
observability a requirement for its occurrence? In the theoretical analysis, I show that the type 
composition of products’ customer bases might also matter for unobservable consumption if 
consumers have imperfect knowledge of their own characteristics. Consumption can then 
serve as a self-signal of consumers’ types. In a second study, I test whether image concerns 
of the type I document in my first study extend to the domain of self-signaling. I apply a 
double-blind procedure and study how product adoptions by right-wing extremists affect 
other consumers’ demand for the product. Conforming to the choices of right-wing extremists 
might constitute a negative self-signal about a subject’s moral values.  
I first collect novel consumption data from right-wing extremists by recruiting 
participants on German neo-Nazi online forums. The right-wing extremists make multiple 
binary product choices in a short online survey. It is essential for the purpose of this study 
that one product be adopted by most participants. I achieve this requirement by using 
products that have incidental connections to symbols popular (or unpopular) among right-
wing extremists, thereby possibly increasing (or decreasing) their attractiveness. One product, 
for example, features the word “milk,” a recent symbol of the alt-right, in its name. However, 
these associations are subtle and not accessible to most people who are not right-wing 
extremists—I use a separate survey to document that the products are inherently neither 
associated with right-wing political views nor seen as particularly popular with neo-Nazis. 
																																																								
6 Previous studies show that people value self-image based on intelligence (e.g., Eil and Rao, 2011; Möbius et al., 2017; 
Zimmermann, 2020). While my findings were unexpected, they are in line with those of McManus and Rao (2015), who find 
that subjects considered intelligence a desirable trait but also disliked signaling it to others. 
7 I know of only few examples of firms trying to avoid customers that have undesirable characteristics unrelated to moral 
values. Abercrombie & Fitch did not produce XL or XXL sizes in women’s clothing to avoid having large women wear their 
products (Business Insider, 2013) and paid stars from MTV’s Jersey Shore not to wear their products (Dunn, White, and 





I then study how these product adoptions by right-wing extremists affect participants’ 
willingness to pay for the product in a laboratory experiment. Participants first see the 
choices of right-wing extremists and then choose between the same products. Importantly, 
their choices are entirely private, even to the experimenter. I vary by treatment whether right-
wing extremists’ undesirable identities are revealed to subjects: Some are told that they are 
observing right-wing extremists’ choices, while others are told that they are observing the 
choices of individuals recruited on the internet. This creates a difference in the perceived type 
composition of the product’s customer base. I find that subjects’ willingness to pay for the 
product is statistically significantly lower if it is perceived to have been adopted by right-
wing extremists than if it is perceived to have been adopted by consumers with neutral moral 
values. The effect size is 9.7% of the price of the adopted product, a substantial effect in 
comparisons to retail net margins for similar products. 
In both experiments, I find that subjects care about the moral values of others who 
consume a product when they make consumption choices. This effect occurs for both 
observable and unobservable consumption and for products that do not have recognizable 
properties that directly relate them to certain identities. Thus, I provide unambiguous 
evidence that the type composition of products’ customer bases can affect consumer 
behavior. 
While my findings confirm a key prediction of identity signaling models, they might 
also be explained by motives unrelated to identity signaling. To shed light on subjects’ 
motives, I supplement my experiments with questionnaire evidence that helps me address 
potential alternative interpretations. Evaluating these responses and patterns in the choice 
data, I find that all explanations except identity signaling fail to explain the data. One 
alternative explanation is that the type compositions of products’ customer bases might have 
affected participants’ perceptions of the products. I show that participants’ perceptions of 
product quality and of producers’ moral values do not differ between treatment conditions. 
Other alternative explanations that are excluded by the data are that the statistical association 
between a product and undesirable types results in feelings of disgust linked to the product 
and that consumers are more willing to conform to behaviors of others who share similar 
moral values. Finally, a potential concern is experimenter demand effects, particularly given 
my use of right-wing extremists as the undesirable type in my second study. I note that this 
explanation is inconsistent with the fact that I find a treatment effect only for moral values in 
my first study and not for intelligence; if experimenter demand effects were present, they 




evidence against the importance of experimenter demand effects in the situations studied in 
this paper, applying the method developed by de Quidt, Haushofer, and Roth (2018).  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses how this paper 
relates and contributes to the previous literature. Section 3 describes the theoretical 
framework that I use to develop my hypothesis. In Sections 4 and 5, I present the design and 
results from my first and second study, respectively. In Section 6, I discuss potential 
explanations for my results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.  
2. Contribution to the literature 
There is an extensive theoretical literature in economics on signaling and consumption, as 
discussed in the Introduction. While most of the early work focuses on signaling of social 
status and wealth (conspicuous consumption), recent models also examine signaling of other 
aspects of identity that are relevant to consumers’ social images (Kuksov, 2007; Kuksov, 
Shachar and Wang, 2013; Kuksov and Wang, 2013; Carbajal, Hall and Li, 2016; 
Friedrichsen, 2018). The key prediction for consumer behavior in these models is that 
individuals care about the type composition of products’ customer bases.8  This paper 
provides important supportive evidence for this prediction.9  
The empirical literature has focused on wealth signaling through conspicuous 
consumption of expensive goods (Bloch, Rao and Desai, 2004; Charles, Hurst, and 
Roussanov, 2009; Heffetz, 2011, 2018; Bursztyn et al., 2018; Clingingsmith and Sheremeta, 
2018; Cosaerts, 2018) and on signaling of moral values through consumption of goods with 
positive social impact (Sexton and Sexton, 2014; Delgado, Harriger and Khanna, 2015; 
Friedrichsen and Engelmann, 2018). In these studies, signaling is characterized by a direct 
link between properties of the product (its price or its social impact) and the image to be 
signaled (being wealthy or being moral). Most products, however, do not exhibit strong 
inherent associations with desirable or undesirable personal characteristics. The initial 
contribution of this paper is to provide evidence that identity signaling motives can also 
affect demand for such products. In my experiments, signals emerge through statistical 
associations between products and certain types of customers and not through properties of 
the products themselves. The second contribution of my work is to provide clear evidence 
																																																								
8 There are related models that assume people care about the number of other consumers who buy a product (“bandwagon 
effects”; Leibenstein, 1950), about others’ unmet desire for a product (Imas and Madarasz, 2020), and about how their 
consumption levels compare to others (e.g., Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004). The latter motive is sometimes interpreted as 
status signaling. In these model, consumers do not care about other consumers’ types. 
9 From a theoretical point of view, my studies also provide evidence of a systematic violation of a basic assumption in 
consumer theory, that is, that consumers do not care about others’ consumption bundles. Contrary to this assumption, 




that people care about the type composition of products’ customer bases.10 Finally, this 
paper’s investigation of self-signaling (Study 2) fills a gap in the previous literature. My 
findings suggest that identity signaling motives are not limited to observable (“conspicuous”) 
consumption but also affect unobservable consumption. 
This paper also relates to identity economics. In the model of Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000), people belong to a particular category, or, type (e.g., male or female). Each type is 
linked to “appropriate” behavior (e.g., women should not work as lawyers). If people do not 
choose an appropriate action, they face costs in terms of a lower self-image.11 Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) propose that people’s self-images, or identities, can depend on the choices 
that other types of people make. They write that “a woman working in a ‘man’s’ job may 
make male colleagues feel less like ‘men,’” which then makes the job less attractive for men. 
My studies provide supportive evidence of such effects in the domains of consumption and 
moral values. Product adoptions by consumers with “bad” moral values make the products 
less attractive for “moral” consumers. 
Moreover, my paper contributes to work on ideology and consumption. Groups with 
different political ideologies systematically differ in their product and brand choices (e.g., 
Gebru et al. 2017; Bertrand and Kamenica, 2020; Kapner and Chinni, 2019). Recent studies 
in political science and psychology investigate reasons for this divide, focusing on 
differences in tastes and personality (Khan, Misra, and Singh, 2013; Kidwell, Farmer, and 
Hardesty, 2013; Roos and Shachar, 2014) and companies’ values (McConnell et al., 2018). 
My study demonstrates that consumers care about the moral values (or ideology) of products’ 
customer bases. Differences in brand choices between conservatives and liberals might thus 
reflect consumers’ desire to signal their political positions; liberals, for example, might then 
be attracted to products that are popular among other liberals and avoid products popular 
among conservatives. 
Finally, my investigation adds to the literature on conformity and peer effects (e.g., 
Krupka and Weber, 2009; Zafar, 2011; Bernheim and Exley, 2015; Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 
																																																								
10 In prior work, it remains unclear whether people buy (or avoid) a product because of the product’s properties or because of 
the type composition of the product’s customer base. There is a small literature in marketing that investigates whether 
consumers care about who else buys a particular product (White and Dahl, 2006, 2007; Berger and Heath, 2007, 2008). The 
validity of these studies, however, is limited because they either rely on hypothetical choice situations or suffer from low 
sample sizes with limited statistical power to detect effects. In addition, it often remains unclear what drives the results. 
White and Dahl (2006), for example, look at hypothetical choices between steaks of two different sizes. They call the small 
steak either “chef's cut” or “ladies’ cut,” and find that men avoid the “ladies’ cut.” In this setting, treatment differences could 
be the result of a difference in the perception of whether the small steak satisfies the participant’s appetite. Moreover, none 
of this work investigates conformity to desirable and undesirable types. 
11 Atkin, Colson-Sihra, and Shayo (forthcoming) apply the model of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) to food choices and 
provide evidence that identity concerns (religion and ethnicity) interact with group salience and group status to shape 




2015; Gioia, 2017; Bigenho and Martinez, 2018). Bernheim (1994) and Andreoni and 
Bernheim (2009) study how image concerns can result in conformity to prosocial behavior. 
Fatas, Hargreaves Heap, and Rojo Arjona (2018) and Dimant (2019) present evidence that 
conformity to prosocial behavior can depend on similarity to peers. I add to this literature by 
showing that conformity in consumption choices depends on the desirability of others’ types.  
3. Theoretical framework  
My study is guided by a simple model of identity signaling and consumption, building on 
Bernheim (1994) and Bénabou and Tirole (2011). I present the detailed model in Appendix 
B; in this section, I focus on the model’s key insights. Note that I do not seek to expand the 
theoretical literature on identity signaling and consumption but rather to apply it to the 
specific contexts studied in my experiments. 
A critical feature of the model and the situations that I study is that individuals 
possess individual characteristics, or types, that are relevant to their self- or social image. For 
example, they may differ in terms of moral values. Individuals have undesirable, “neutral,” or 
desirable characteristics, associated with image 𝑣! < 𝑣! < 𝑣!. Individuals have imperfect 
knowledge about others’ types but can potentially receive signals through observing these 
others’ consumption. An individual’s social image, 𝐸 𝑣 𝑥 , is, therefore, the expected value 
of that person’s image conditional on that person’s consumption choice, 𝑥.12 
Individuals choose between two products, A and B. I study contexts in which 
individuals with either undesirable or desirable characteristics, which I refer to as the targets, 
adopt product A.13 Undesirable targets may be, for example, right-wing extremists. I then 
investigate how the desirability of targets’ characteristics affects the popularity of the product 
among others with relatively “neutral” characteristics, whom I label the consumers. 
Consumers may be, for example, the general population. I compare a situation in which 
targets have desirable characteristics with a situation in which targets have undesirable 
characteristics. 
The consumers care about the public perception of their type. They maximize 
𝑢! 𝑥 + 𝜃𝐸 𝑣 𝑥 , where 𝜃 > 0 is the weight they put on their social image and 𝑢!(𝑥) is the 
consumption utility from product 𝑥.  There are two types of consumers, reflecting 
																																																								
12 𝐸(𝑣|𝑥) depends on the equilibrium strategies of all types of individuals and is calculated by applying Bayes’s rule. 
13 That is, all targets choose product A. There are multiple assumptions that can rationalize such behavior. For example, 
targets can be assumed to receive substantially more consumption utility from product A than from product B (𝑢!"#$%! 𝐴 −




heterogeneity in tastes: 𝑎-consumers derive more consumption utility from A (𝑢! 𝐴 >
𝑢! 𝐵 ) and 𝑏-consumers derive more consumption utility from B (𝑢! 𝐵 > 𝑢! 𝐴 ).  
How does the desirability of targets’ characteristics affect consumers’ demand for 
product A? Suppose that the targets have desirable characteristics. Choosing product A then 
increases a consumer’s image, as others might confuse this person with a target (i.e., 
𝐸 𝑣 𝐴 > 𝐸 𝑣 𝐵 ). For the 𝑎-consumers, there is thus no trade-off between consumption 
utility and image, so they choose A. If the 𝑏-consumers are sufficiently concerned about their 
social image, they also choose A. Suppose now that the targets have undesirable 
characteristics. Conforming to the targets’ consumption choices then decreases consumers’ 
social image (𝐸 𝑣 𝐴 < 𝐸 𝑣 𝐵 ). Hence, the 𝑏-consumers do not face a trade-off between 
consumption utility and image and choose B. The 𝑎-consumers might also choose product B. 
So the consumers choose product A weakly more often if it is adopted by targets with 
desirable characteristics than if it is adopted by targets with undesirable characteristics. This 
inequality holds strictly as long as consumers are sufficiently concerned about their social 
image (see the Proposition in Appendix B).14 
In Appendix B, I extend the model to the domain of self-signaling, building on 
Bénabou and Tirole (2011). In this version of the model, choices are private information and 
consumers have imperfect knowledge of their own types. Consumers’ past choices are then 
self-signals about their own types. The model predicts that consumers also care about the 
type compositions of products’ customer bases in such settings, if they are sufficiently 
concerned about their self-image.  
In the following, I test the model’s main prediction in laboratory experiments. My 
empirical investigation closely follows the theoretical framework. A product is adopted by 
certain types of customers, the targets. I then vary by treatment the desirability of targets’ 
characteristics and study how this affects the demand for the product among others, the 
consumers.  
In Study 1, I introduce social image concerns by revealing choices to observers. In 
this setting, 𝜃 captures how much consumers care about observers’ beliefs that they have the 
																																																								
14 Note that right-wing extremists are rare, so the base rate that a person will be a right-wing extremist is low. Thus, if people 
form their beliefs rationally, their beliefs that an individual will be a right-wing extremist might not change substantially 
after observing that individual conforming to the choices of right-wing extremist. Indeed, the model predicts that, when the 
share of targets in the population is low, targets’ characteristics only matter when 𝜃 is large. However, prior work shows that 
people tend to ignore base rates and rely on a representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973), which may 
increase the perceived diagnosticity of consumption signals. Moreover, even if the individual is not perceived as an 
extremist, she might still be perceived as having right-wing attitudes. Study 2 provides evidence that right-wing extremists 




targets’ characteristics. I attempt to choose desirable and undesirable characteristics that 
induce high levels of 𝜃—a requirement for testing the model’s prediction.  
In Study 2, I investigate whether identity signaling extends to the domain of self-
signaling. A key requirement for self-signaling to occur, according to the model, is that 
participants are insecure about their own type. Thus, the design attempts to increase 
participants’ insecurity.  
4. Study 1: Consumption in public settings 
Study 1 tests whether people care about the type of others who buy a product when 
consumption is publicly observable. As outlined in the theoretical framework, I study 
contexts in which a product is adopted by a set of people, the targets. I vary the desirability of 
targets’ characteristics and study how this affects the consumption choices of other 
participants, the consumers. To create social image concerns, the consumers’ choices are 
observed by others, the observers. I relax anonymity by linking choices to portrait 
photographs. I create a situation in which consumption choices are informative signals about 
consumers’ characteristics: If consumers choose the product that is adopted by the targets, the 
observers may potentially confuse them with the targets, which affects their social image. 
However, the presence of the hypothesized effect rests on consumers caring sufficiently 
about their social image and anticipating that their consumption choices will provide a signal 
of their image. 
4.1 Experimental design  
The experiment consists of three parts. In Part 1, I classify participants into consumers and 
targets, based on measures of their intelligence and moral values. In Part 2, targets choose 
between two products. Next, each consumer is matched to one target, learns the choice and 
type of that target, and chooses between the same two products. There are two rounds of such 
consumption choices, one related to intelligence and one to moral values. Finally, in Part 3, I 
reveal the choices of targets and consumers to observers. Figure 1 gives the timeline of the 
study.  
The key part of the design is that choices signal information about consumers’ 
characteristics to observers. This is implemented as follows: The observers see the portrait 
photograph and choice of either a consumer or that consumer’s matched target, each with a 
probability of 50%. Importantly, observers do not learn whether the portrait they see is that of 




choice the target made. From the observers’ perspective, the customer base of the product 
chosen by the target is thus statistically associated with a certain type of customer. If the 
consumer conforms to the target’s choice, the observers will observe the consumer’s 
photograph with the knowledge that this person chose the product type chosen by the target. 
This is analogous to, for example, knowing that antisocial individuals wear a particular 
clothing brand and seeing a person wearing the same clothing brand. However, if the 
consumer avoids the product chosen by the target, she can signal to the observers that she is 
not the target. This situation closely reflects the one studied in the theoretical analysis and is 
explained in detail in Section 4.1.3 and Figure 2.  
 
Figure 1: Timeline 
 
 
4.1.1 Part 1: Classifying consumers and targets 
First, participants’ intelligence and moral values are measured, on the basis of which they are 
classified into consumers and targets. While participants are unaware of what will follow in 
Parts 2 and 3 of the experiment, it is announced that others might receive noisy signals about 
their performance in the intelligence test and about their choices in the moral value task. 
Measuring intelligence. I measure participants’ intelligence with a test consisting of 
12 Raven’s matrices. Raven’s matrices have been successfully used in previous studies to 
induce image concerns (e.g., in Zimmermann, 2020). Subjects see patterns in which one part 
is missing. For each pattern, they are given eight possible suggestions for how to complete it. 
Subjects have 12 minutes to complete the 12 patterns. For every correct pattern, they earn 
CHF 0.50 (CHF 1 ≈ USD 1). Before subjects start with the test, they solve two training 
patterns. Subjects are told that Raven’s matrices are regularly used to measure general 
intelligence. They do not receive feedback about their performance.  
Measuring moral values. To measure moral values, I give subjects the option to 
increase their payoff by authorizing the researchers to make a donation on their behalf to 
Zukunft CH, a conservative Christian organization whose values are perceived negatively 
among most students in Zurich. Answers collected in a separate online survey suggest that 
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participants dislike being publicly perceived as donors to Zukunft CH (see Appendix C.1 for 
details).  
Subjects receive an endowment of CHF 6. They then choose one of the seven options 
shown in Table 1, each jointly determining a payment to the subject and a donation to 
Zukunft CH. I include both positive and negative donations to increase the perceived 
discrepancy between the “morally good” and the “morally bad” actions, and to avoid having 
most subjects choose options on the boundary (Option 1 or Option 7). Negative donations are 
explained as “preventing donations from other participants from being implemented.” To 
implement subjects’ choices, all individual donations are added up. 15  Donations are 
anonymous and are not subtracted from the participants’ payments.  
 
Table 1: Measuring moral values 
Option In addition to the CHF 
6.00 endowment, the 
subject receives 
Donation to Zukunft CH 
on behalf of subject 
1 + CHF 6.00  + CHF 9.00  
2 + CHF 4.00  + CHF 6.00  
3 + CHF 2.00  + CHF 3.00  
4 + CHF 0.00  + CHF 0.00  
5 − CHF 2.00  − CHF 3.00  
6 − CHF 4.00  − CHF 6.00  
7 − CHF 6.00  − CHF 9.00  
 
Classifying consumers and targets. Subjects are then classified into targets and 
consumers. For each of the two rounds of consumption choice, two participants are selected 
to play the role of the (desirable and undesirable) targets in this round. Targets differ between 
rounds. For one round, targets are selected on the basis of their intelligence score. The subject 
with the lowest intelligence score among all subjects in the session is selected to be the 
undesirable target and the subject with the highest intelligence score is selected to be the 
desirable target.16 For the other round, targets are selected on the basis of their donation to 
Zukunft CH. The subject who made the highest donation to Zukunft CH is selected to be the 
undesirable target and the subject who made the lowest donation to Zukunft CH is selected to 
be the desirable target. If multiple subjects qualify to play the role of a target, one of them is 
																																																								
15 Note that this procedure does not preclude a negative total donation. Data from an online pilot survey suggested that this is 
not an issue (see Appendix C.1). Moreover, the payoffs are scaled to assure that the final donation to Zukunft CH will be 
small and, therefore, inconsequential. The final experiment resulted in a total donation of CHF 237. No research funds were 
used to pay for this donation. 




selected at random. Participants who are not a target in a given round are selected to play the 
role of a consumer in that round. Therefore, in a session with N participants, each round 
consists of two targets and N − 2 consumers. 
4.1.2 Part 2: Consumption choices 
Next, participants choose between two products twice. Choice sets differ between the first 
round and the second round. In one round, subjects choose between two packs of chocolate 
bars, one produced by Camille Bloch and the other by Munz. Both packs consist of 5 
chocolate bars, 23 grams each, and are priced at about CHF 3.50. In the other round, subjects 
choose between a cup and a 4-GB USB stick. The market prices of the cup and the 4-GB 
USB stick are about CHF 8 and CHF 4, respectively.17 I randomize the order of choice sets at 
the session level.  
In each round, the round’s targets first choose between the two products available in 
that round.18 Next, the consumers are matched with one target and learn that target’s type and 
choice. They are, for example, told that “the participant with the lowest intelligence score 
chose the cup.” Which target they observe depends on the treatment condition: 
• Subjects in the undesirable condition learn the type and choice of the target 
with undesirable characteristics. 
• Subjects in the desirable condition learn the type and choice of the target with 
desirable characteristics. 
Assignment to treatment conditions is randomized within sessions. Each subject is assigned 
to the same treatment condition for both rounds.  
After consumers learn the type and choice of their target, they choose between the 
same products. Instead of one binary choice, I elicit consumers’ willingness to pay to receive 
one product instead of the other product.19 To do so, consumers make 13 decisions between 
product-and-money bundles, as shown in Table 2. At the end of the experiment, one of the 13 
cases is randomly drawn in each round for possible implementation.  
																																																								
17 I selected the 4-GB USB stick and the cup, and the two kinds of chocolates, because the responses in an online survey (see 
Appendix C.1) suggested that the distribution of the willingness to pay to receive the 4-GB USB stick instead of the cup, and 
the Munz chocolate instead the Camille Bloch chocolate, is symmetric with a mean of zero. (However, as I will discuss later, 
in the laboratory experiment, the UBS stick was more popular than the cup.) 
18 Targets do not learn about their role in the experiment; they are only told that others might learn about their choice. Not 
informing targets protects their self-image as it keeps them ignorant about their relative performance. This design choice is 
valid for the purpose of this study as the focus lies on consumers’ choices; targets’ choices only serve as a means to create a 
statistical association between a product and certain types of consumers. 
19 I elicit the willingness to pay to collect more extensive data. Bénabou, Falk, Henkel and Tirole (2020) point out that image 
concerns can interact with elicitation methods to affect the measurement of moral preferences. While my use of the multiple 
price list could reinforce or diminish image concern—thereby potentially affecting the size of the treatment effect— it does 




In the first round, participants make the 13 decisions between two products and for a 
target in one of the two domains—intelligence or moral values. After making the 13 
decisions, the second round starts; they are shown the two other products and the target’s 
choice between the products for the other domain. 
 
Table 2: Consumers’ choices 
Decision Choice situation 
1 Munz + CHF 3.00  or Camille Bloch 
2 Munz + CHF 2.50  or Camille Bloch 
3 Munz + CHF 2.00  or Camille Bloch 
4 Munz + CHF 1.50  or Camille Bloch 
5 Munz + CHF 1.00  or Camille Bloch 
6 Munz + CHF 0.50  or Camille Bloch 
7 Munz or Camille Bloch 
8 Munz or Camille Bloch + CHF 0.50  
9 Munz or Camille Bloch + CHF 1.00  
10 Munz or Camille Bloch + CHF 1.50  
11 Munz or Camille Bloch + CHF 2.00  
12 Munz or Camille Bloch + CHF 2.50  
13 Munz or Camille Bloch + CHF 3.00  
 
4.1.3 Part 3: Signaling through consumption 
After subjects finish both rounds of consumption choices, choices are revealed to up to 14 
observers. The following procedure statistically associates the customer base of one product 
with certain types of customers. The procedure is illustrated in Figure 2. 
The observers are shown a portrait photograph and the choice made by that person.20 
This person can be either a consumer or that consumer’s target, depending on the flip of a 
computerized fair coin.21 Importantly, observers do not learn the outcome of the coin flip, 
that is, they are not told whether they are seeing the consumer or the target. However, I tell 
observers the type and choice of the target. This creates a statistical association between the 
product and a certain type of customer. Hence, observers can infer information about the 
observed person’s characteristics by comparing the choice of the person they observe with 
the target’s choice: If the choice of the person corresponds to the target’s choice, the person 
might be the target. However, if the choice differs from the target’s choice, the person must 
be the consumer and not the target. Thus, conforming to the undesirable (desirable) target 
																																																								
20 The picture is taken at the very beginning of the experiment, before subjects enter the lab. 
21 Remember that the consumer makes choices for 13 cases. If the coin flip selects the consumer, the observer does not see 
the choices for all 13 cases but only which product the consumer chose for one randomly drawn case. This randomly drawn 




likely decreases (increases) the consumer’s social image. Figure 2 illustrates this procedure 
with an example in which the target—the person with the undesirable quality of scoring 
lowest on the intelligence test—chose the cup. I explain this procedure in detail to consumers 
before they make their choices and test their understanding of the instructions through 
comprehension questions. 
 
Figure 2: Signaling through consumption 
 
Notes: The figure illustrates how choices are revealed to the observers such that the customer base of one 
product is statistically associated with certain types of customers. In the illustrated case, the consumer is paired 
with the target with the lowest intelligence score and that target chose the cup. The observers learn the type and 
the choice of the consumer’s target (“The participant with the lowest intelligence score chose the cup”). 
Moreover, the observers see the picture and choice of either the target or the consumer, depending on the coin 
flip (see boxes in dotted lines). The observers do not know whether tails or heads is realized. The boxes in solid 
lines therefore give the observers’ information sets.  
 
In each round, choices of only three randomly drawn consumers are implemented and 
(possibly) revealed to observers. The choices of all other consumers are neither implemented 
nor seen by any observer, but instead these remaining consumers serve in the role of 
observers. Each observer is matched to two of the drawn consumers such that each drawn 
consumer is (possibly) observed by two thirds of all observers.22 The reason I implement only 
																																																								
22 The matching between consumers and observers works as follows: Starting with round 1, all consumers of this round are 
randomly assigned to three groups of equal size (groups 1–3). Next, one member of each group is randomly drawn. The 
choices of these three subjects are implemented. All members of group 1 play the roles of observers for the drawn 
consumers of group 2 and group 3. In a similar manner, the members of group 2 play the role of observers for group 1 and 
group 3, and the members of group 3 play the role of observers for groups 1 and 2. The same procedure is then repeated for 
the second round. Note that each of the drawn consumers is, thus, observed by two thirds of all consumers, resulting in 
between 11 and 14 observers. 
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three choices in each round is (i) to match consumers with many observers while (ii) limiting 
the number of participants each observer sees. The former is important to induce sufficiently 
strong social image concerns. The latter is important to ensure that a target’s identity is never 
revealed with certainty to observers, thereby protecting the social image of undesirable 
targets.23 Targets’ choices are always implemented, that is, they always receive the product 
they chose. Consumers are informed about the number of observers and about the probability 
with which their choice will be implemented before they make their choice. 
4.1.4 Questionnaire 
At the end of the experiment, but before consumers’ choices are revealed to observers, 
subjects fill out a short questionnaire. Most importantly, I measure subjects’ perceptions of 
the four products used in the experiment.24 I provide additional details on the questionnaire in 
Section 6, when I discuss different explanations for my findings. 
4.1.5 Procedural details 
I preregistered the data collection and analysis (AEARCTR-0004268). I aimed for a sample 
size of 160 participants. According to my simulations, the statistical power with this sample 
size was 80% to detect an effect size equal to CHF 0.50 (as outlined in my pre-analysis plan). 
I conducted eight sessions, each consisting of between 19 and 24 participants. In total, 87 
subjects participated in the desirable condition and 81 in the undesirable condition. All 
sessions took place at the Laboratory for Experimental and Behavioral Economics at the 
University of Zurich, in June 2019. Participants were recruited using hroot (Bock, Baetge, 
and Nicklisch, 2014) from the joint subject pool of the University of Zurich and the Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology. The experiment was implemented using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Appendix D.1 supplies the instructions for the study. My study obtained 
ethical approval from the Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Economics, Business 
Administration, and Information Technology at the University of Zurich. 
																																																								
23 The following procedure guarantees that targets are never revealed with certainty to observers. For each round, consumers 
play the role of an observer for two other consumers. If these two consumers share the same target and “heads” comes up 
twice, the observer would see the picture of the same person (the target) twice. This would reveal to the observer that the 
person in the picture is the target. To avoid this issue, the two coin flips are either tails–heads or heads–tails, each with a 
probability of 50%. While this procedure creates a dependency in the realization of coin flips, it does not affect the 
individual probabilities that a target or a consumer is drawn. Hence, the procedure corresponds, from a subject’s perspective, 
to the procedure explained above. Note that this procedure requires participants to play the role of an observer for at most 
two consumers in each round. 
24 In addition, I elicit subjects’ demographics, their willingness to pay to receive each of the products in private, and how 





On average, subjects solved 8.41 of 12 Raven’s matrices (std. dev. = 2.01). Only 4.71% of 
subjects solved all 12 matrices, and the minimal number of matrices solved was 3. For moral 
values, the median (and modal) choice was the option that neither increased nor decreased the 
donation to Zukunft CH (Option 4). A total of 32.35% of subjects chose the option that 
maximized their own payoff and the donation to Zukunft CH (Option 1), while 14.12% of 
subjects chose the option that minimized the donation to Zukunft CH and their own payoff 
(Option 7). Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix provide the full distribution for intelligence 
and moral values.  
A majority of targets preferred Munz chocolate over Camille Bloch Torino chocolate 
(10 of 16) and the 4-GB USB stick over the cup (11 of 16). Targets’ choices are unbalanced 
between treatment conditions (see Appendix Figure A3).25 I account for these differences in 
the analysis of consumer behavior. 
In the following, I focus on consumers’ choices. Consumers chose between product-
and-money bundles. Six subjects made product choices that are non-monotone in money, and 
one subject did so in both rounds. These seven observations are excluded from my analysis.26 
The fact that most subjects exhibit monotone choice patterns can be seen as an indicator that 
subjects understood the choices they were facing.  
 
Figure 3: Consumers’ consumption by treatment condition 
	  
																																																								
25 The treatment difference in the share of targets that chose the cup and in the share of targets that chose the Camille Bloch 
Torino chocolate is not statistically significant different from zero (tests of proportions, z = 0.54, p = 0.59, and z = 1.03, p = 
0.30, respectively). 
26 Specifically, these subjects chose (A, CHF X) over (B, CHF 0) but (B, CHF 0) over (A, CHF X − 0.5), where A and B are 
either the two kinds of chocolates or the cup and the USB stick. I pre-registered that I drop these observations. Appendix 























I now turn to the question of whether the type composition of products’ customer 
bases affects consumers’ choices, the focus of this paper. I first pool that data from the moral 
values round and the intelligence round and look at the binary choice between the two 
products when neither of them is bundled with a monetary payment. 27 Figure 3 provides 
supportive evidence for the prediction of the theoretical analyses: Consumers chose the 
option that was chosen by their target less often in the undesirable condition than in the 
desirable condition. Table 3, column (1) gives the estimated coefficients of a linear regression 
of the probability of choosing the same option as the target on a treatment dummy (1 = 
undesirable condition). Column (2) adds session fixed effects to the specification. Subjects 
are 16.8 percentage points less likely to choose the product adopted by their target in the 
undesirable condition than in the desirable condition (p = 0.003). 
 
Table 3: Relationship between consumers’ choices and targets’ types, Study 1 
Dependent 
variable 
Pr(Conform to target) WTP for target’s product 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














1 = target chose 
Munz   
0.166* 
(1.79)   
0.160 
(0.78) 
1 = target chose 
cup   
-0.045 
(-0.44)   
-0.193 
(-0.63) 
1 = target chose 
USB stick   
0.240*** 
(2.98)   
0.400* 
(1.91) 
Constant 0.632***   (16.34)   
-0.082 
(0.78)   
Log(sigma)    1.337*** (15.06) 
1.310*** 
(15.00)  
N 301 301 301 301 301 301 
Session fixed 
effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Notes: Columns (1)–(3): Linear regressions of probability of choosing the same product as the target when 
neither of the two products is connected with any payment on a treatment dummy, a constant, and, depending on 
the specification, session fixed effects and controls for the targets’ choices. Columns (4)–(6): Tobit regressions 
(left-censored at CHF −3, n = 17; right-censored at CHF +3, n = 10) of willingness to pay (WTP) to receive 
the same product as the target instead of the other product on the same set of variables. The t statistics are 
given in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at subject level (168 clusters). * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p 
< 0.01. 
																																																								
27 I preregistered participants’ willingness to pay to receive the same product as their targets instead of receiving the other 
product as the main outcome variable. I discuss the willingness to pay next. Note that while results are qualitatively similar 




Remember that targets’ choices are unbalanced between conditions. This introduces a 
bias in the estimation of the treatment effect. Specification (3) accounts for this issue by 
controlling for the targets’ choices; the estimated treatment effect increases to 20.9 
percentage points. This issue can also be addressed by estimating treatment effects separately 
for each possible target choice. I obtain similar results under this approach (see Figure A4a in 
the Appendix). 
The choice data collected allow me to calculate participants’ willingness to pay to 
receive the same product as their target instead of the other product.28 Note that this variable 
is left-censored at CHF −3 (10 observations) and right-censored at CHF 3 (17 observations). 
Figure A5 in the Appendix gives the cumulative distribution of the willingness to pay.  
Table 3, column (4) gives the estimates from a tobit regression of the willingness to 
pay on a treatment dummy. The specification in column (5) adds fixed effects, and the 
specification in column (6) controls for targets’ choices. The estimates support the prediction 
of the theoretical analysis in that the coefficient is negative in all three specifications. That is, 
consumers’ willingness to pay is lower for a product that is adopted by individuals with 
undesirable characteristics than for a product that is adopted by people with desirable 
characteristics. However, the effect is significant (at the 5% level) only in the specification 
that controls for targets’ choices. Results are qualitatively similar (and statistically 
significant) if treatment effects are estimated separately for each possible target choice (see 
Figure A4b in the Appendix).  
Next, I investigate whether treatment effects differ between the moral values round 
and the intelligence round. Table 4 replicates the previous analysis, but with treatment effects 
estimated separately for moral values (TE-M) and intelligence (TE-I). There is a statistically 
significant treatment effect for moral values in all six specifications. Surprisingly, however, 
none of the specifications yields a significant treatment effect for intelligence. The difference 
in treatment effects is statistically significant for the willingness to pay measure.29 These 
findings suggest that subjects care more about the public perception of their moral values 
than the public perception of their intelligence when making consumption choices. In terms 
of the model, this means that 𝜃!"!"# !"#$%& is bigger than 𝜃!"#$%%!&$"'$. This might explain 
																																																								
28 Note that my data are discrete because I use the list method. Hence, for a subject who chooses Camille Bloch in the choice 
situation “(Camille Bloch, CHF 1.50) or (Munz, CHF 0)” but Munz in the choice situation “(Camille Bloch, CHF 1) or 
(Munz, CHF 0),” the difference in monetary value must be in [CHF 1, CHF 1.5]. I set this difference to CHF 1.25. 
29 Results are qualitatively similar if treatment effects are estimated separately for the target choices (see Figure A4c–f in the 
Appendix). Figure A5 in the Appendix gives the cumulative distribution functions of subjects’ willingness to pay conditional 
on treatment and round. I pre-registered that I would look at both heterogeneous treatment effects for intelligence and moral 
values and heterogeneous treatment effects for the two choice sets used. I do not find differences for the choice sets: 




why firms appear to be particularly concerned with the moral values of their customers, as 
suggested by the examples in the Introduction. 
 
Table 4: Treatment effects for intelligence and moral values 
Dependent variable Pr(Conform to target) WTP for target’s product 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 = undesirable condition  













1 = undesirable condition  
























Constant 0.688 (12.94)   
0.187 
(1.22)   





p value TE-M==TE-I 0.055 0.065 0.161 0.020 0.024 0.040 
N 301 301 301 301 301 301 
Session fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Target choice controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: Columns (1)–(3): Linear regressions of probability of choosing the same product as the target when 
neither of the two products is connected with any payment on the interaction between a treatment dummy and a 
dummy for being in the moral values round (TE-M), the interaction between a treatment dummy and a dummy 
for being in the intelligence round (TE-I), a dummy for being in the intelligence round, (1 = intelligence round), 
a constant, and, depending on the specification, session fixed effects and controls for the targets’ choices. 
Columns (4)–(6): Tobit regressions (left-censored at CHF −3, n = 17; right-censored at CHF +3, n = 10) of 
willingness to pay (WTP) to receive the same product as the target instead of the other product on the same set 
of independent variables. The t statistics are in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at subject level (168 
clusters). *** p < 0.01. 
 
How large are these effect sizes? The average price of the product adopted by the 
target is CHF 4.39. In the pooled data, subjects’ willingness to pay is estimated to be CHF 
0.33 lower if the product is adopted by the targets with undesirable identities—a decrease of 
7.5% of the average product price. For moral values, the treatment effect is estimated to be 
CHF −0.65—a decrease of 14.8% of the average product price. Given that European net 
margins for food processing, food retail, general retail, and electronics are only 6.76%, 
1.67%, -0.48%, and 11.83%, respectively (Damodaran, 2019), product adoptions by 
customers with undesirable characteristics could have non-negligible effects on the 




To summarize, this study provides evidence that consumers care about the moral 
values of others who consume a product in a setting where choices are observed by others. 
However, many products are consumed in more anonymous settings, where such social 
signaling is unlikely to play an important role. Do the moral values of a product’s customer 
base also matter in such contexts? I address this question in a second study. 
5. Study 2: Consumption in private settings 
In the second study, I investigate whether people care about the moral values of a product’s 
customer base when product choices are private information. This study allows me to test 
whether image concerns of the type I document in my first study extend to the domain of 
self-signaling.  
As in Study 1, I investigate contexts in which a product is adopted by a set of people, 
the targets, and study how the desirability of targets’ moral values affects choices of others, 
the consumers. Unlike Study 1, however, consumers’ choices are entirely private, even to the 
experimenter. The theoretical analysis predicts that consumers might avoid products adopted 
by undesirable types even in such settings if they are insecure about their own characteristics 
and sufficiently concerned with their self-image. 
Studying self-signaling requires a substantially different design from the one used in 
Study 1. Apart from applying a double-blind procedure, the design of Study 2 differs in two 
other important aspects from the first study.  
First, in Study 2 a product is adopted by many targets. Self-signaling requires subjects 
to believe that a significant share of a product’s customers base consists of people with 
certain characteristics in order for consumption to be an informative signal about types.30 
Observing the choice of only one target with a desirable or undesirable type, as done in Study 
1, might not alter the perceived composition of a product’s customer base in they eyes of 
consumers. 
Second, I attempt to increase subjects’ uncertainty about their own moral values. Such 
uncertainty is a necessary condition for self-signaling to occur, according to the model (see 
also Bénabou and Tirole, 2011). I do so by threatening subjects’ moral identities. Identity 
threats are commonly used in psychology to investigate self-image concerns (e.g., Dutton and 
Lake, 1973; Monin and Miller, 2001) and are an integral part of economic models of self-
signaling and morality (Bénabou and Tirole, 2011).  
																																																								
30 For social-signaling, the choice of one target suffices to statistically associate a product with certain types of people in the 




To further strengthen self-image concerns, I recruit targets with characteristics that 
are likely perceived as very undesirable by the consumers: right-wing extremists. 
Conforming to the choices of right-wing extremists might constitute a bad signal about a 
subject’s moral values, for example, in terms of racism. 
5.1 Experimental design  
Participants in a laboratory experiment play the role of consumer and choose between two 
products. Before consumers make their choices, they are informed about the choices made by 
others, the targets. The role of targets is served by right-wing extremists who are recruited 
outside the laboratory. I vary by treatment whether the targets are perceived to have neutral 
moral values (neutral condition) or undesirable moral values (undesirable condition). I do so 
by revealing the political ideology of targets only to the consumers in the undesirable 
condition; consumers in the neutral condition are kept uninformed about the targets’ 
undesirable moral values. Consumers make their choices in a double-blind setting to 
eliminate possible image concerns toward the experimenter. 
5.1.1 The targets: A sample of right-wing extremists 
I collect novel consumption data from 10 individuals recruited on far-right extremist internet 
forums to participate in a short online survey. The survey consists of eight binary product 
choices. One of the eight choice situations is randomly drawn, and participants receive the 
product they chose in this choice situation. I offer an anonymous shipping option.31 Subjects 
also fill out a short demographic questionnaire.  
For the purpose of my study, it is essential that one product be adopted by most of the 
right-wing extremists. To achieve this requirement, I select products with incidental 
connections to symbols liked (or disliked) by right-wing extremists, likely increasing (or 
decreasing) the attractiveness of products. One product, for example, had the word “milk” (a 
recent symbol of the alt-right) in its name. I succeeded in that 9 out of 10 of the extremists 
preferred the “Munz Praliné-Prügeli” milk chocolate over the “Camille Bloch Torino” 
chocolate. Table C1 in Appendix C.2 gives all choice situations and the corresponding 
distribution of the extremists’ choices.  
The incidental associations to symbols liked or disliked by the right-wing extremists 
are subtle and not accessible to most people who are not right-wing extremists. I document 
																																																								
31 Hermes, a German postal service company, allows sending packages to pick-up points instead of specific addresses. 
Alternatively, participants can choose to have the product and the payment sent to an address of their choice. I promise 
participants that all their information will be kept confidential and that addresses will be deleted directly after their payment 




this in a separate online survey with participants drawn from the same subject pool from 
which I recruit participants for the laboratory experiment. Participants neither associate Munz 
(or Camille Bloch) with right-wing extremism nor think that Munz is more useful to or more 
popular with neo-Nazis than Camille Bloch (see Appendix C.3 for details). Any statistical 
associations between products and types are, therefore, created in the experiment and emerge 
through the (perceived) type composition of products’ customer bases. 
5.1.2 The consumers: A laboratory experiment 
Participants in the laboratory experiment play the role of consumers. I investigate how the 
product adoptions of the right-wing extremists affect consumers’ choices. Consumers choose 
between the Munz chocolate and the Camille Bloch chocolate. As discussed in Section 5.1.1, 
the Munz chocolate was very popular with the right-wing extremists, which is a key 
requirement for my study. Another advantage of using the chocolates is that they can be 
consumed in private, which makes it unlikely that consumers avoid Munz because of social 
image concerns. 
In the laboratory, I first threaten consumers’ identities to increase their uncertainty 
about their moral values. Next, consumers learn the choices of the targets. I manipulate the 
perception of the type composition of products’ customer bases by revealing the targets’ 
moral values only to some consumers, which is the key aspect of Study 2. Then, consumers 
make their product choice. Finally, they fill out a survey and receive payment in private. 
Identity threat. I threaten consumers’ personal moral identities to increase their 
uncertainty about their own types. To do so, consumers complete an implicit association test 
(IAT)—a popular test in psychology to measure implicit racism—before they make their 
decision. I use the skin-tone IAT (Nosek et al, 2007). Consumers learn their results from the 
IAT. The IAT very often reveals racism (65–82% of the population are implicit racists, 
according to Project Implicit) and thereby threatens subjects’ identities. Indeed, 45.23% of 
participants reported in the survey at the end of the experiment that the IAT at least 
somewhat threatened their identity. To avoid social-signaling motives, IAT scores are not 
saved, and as a result, neither the experimenter nor any other person sees the scores. To 
strengthen the identity threat, consumers receive detailed information about the interpretation 
of the results from the IAT at the beginning of the experiment. 
Treatments. Next, consumers observe the choices of the 10 targets. Consumers are 
randomly assigned to either the undesirable or the neutral condition. The treatment is 




wing extremists. However, the political ideology of targets is revealed only in the undesirable 
condition. In the neutral condition, consumers are told that the targets were participants in a 
previous study who were recruited online. Participants in both conditions receive 
demographic information about the targets (distribution of gender, age, and education) to 
keep the perception of the targets in domains unrelated to moral values somewhat similar 
between conditions. 
Consumers’ choices. Next, consumers choose between the two kinds of chocolate. 
As in Study 1, consumers make 13 decisions between product-and-money bundles (see Table 
2). Unlike in the first study, however, the choices are elicited in two stages. First, consumers 
make a binary choice between the two products. In this choice situation, none of the products 
are bundled with money. Then, they make the 13 decisions, where the choice between 
(Munz, CHF 0) and (Camille Bloch, CHF 0) is set to subjects’ first-stage choices (but can be 
changed). At the end of the experiment, one of the 13 second-stage choices is randomly 
chosen to be implemented. 
Anonymity. To guarantee consumers’ anonymity, one participant is randomly 
selected to be the “monitor” at the beginning of each session. The monitor pays the 
participants at the end of the study and does not participate in the experiment. The remaining 
participants are in the role of consumers. Each consumer receives a random ID number 
hidden in an envelope. The experimenter cannot match the ID number to the participant. 
Each consumer opens the envelope in private and enters this ID number in the computer 
terminal at which they sit. At the end of the study, each consumer’s monetary payoff and 
chosen product are placed in an envelope labeled only with the anonymous ID number. The 
monitor, who does not know the contents of any of the envelopes, distributes the envelopes to 
the consumers based one their ID numbers at the end of the study. 
Survey. Before consumers receive their payment, they fill out a survey. It takes 20 to 
30 minutes to fill the payment envelopes after consumers make their product choices. Thus, 
the survey is very long to keep subjects occupied. Most importantly, the survey elicits 
consumers’ perception of the products and tests for experimenter demand effects.32 I provide 
additional details on the questionnaire in Section 6, where I discuss different explanations for 
my findings.  
																																																								
32 I included many questions to keep subjects occupied and to potentially inform future research. The questionnaire contains 
question about political attitudes, expected use of the chocolate, familiarity with the chocolates, familiarity with the IAT and 
whether the IAT threatened subjects’ identities, beliefs about the behavior of the other participants, willingness to pay for a 
different chocolate brands, image concerns, how prone subjects are to disgust, attitudes toward products popular with neo-
Nazis, beliefs about popularity of the products among different groups of people, and demographics. The complete 




Sequence. Consumers receive instructions explaining the entire experiment. While 
the instructions explain that they have to choose between two products (“product A” and 
“product B”) in the 13 cases, it is not revealed what these products are. Instructions announce 
that participants will observe the choices of “10 participants from a previous study” but do 
not give any information about the types or choices of the targets. To strengthen the identity 
threat, the instructions contain detailed information about the IAT. Participants’ 
understanding of the instructions is tested through comprehension questions. Then, 
depending on the treatment condition, they are told that the 10 other participants are either 
right-wing extremists or unspecified participants recruited on the internet. Next, it is revealed 
that the products correspond to Camille Bloch chocolate and Munz chocolate. At the same 
time, consumers learn that 9 out of 10 targets chose the Munz chocolate. This procedure 
prevents consumers from evaluating the products before they learn the preferences of the 
targets. Next, consumers choose between the two chocolates. Finally, consumers fill out a 
survey and then receive their payment from the monitor.  
Procedure. I conducted 11 sessions, each consisting of between 19 and 23 
participants, resulting in a total of 243 participants (113 in the neutral condition, 119 in the 
undesirable condition and 11 monitors). All sessions took place at the Laboratory for 
Experimental and Behavioral Economics at the University of Zurich, in December 2018. 
Participants were recruited using hroot (Bock, Baetge, and Nicklisch, 2014) from the joint 
subject pool of the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. The 
experiment was implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and, for the IAT, Minno.js 
(Zlotnick, Dzikiewicz, and Bar-Anan, 2015). Appendix D.2 supplies the instructions for the 
study. This study obtained ethical approval from the Human Subjects Committee of the 
Faculty of Economics, Business Administration, and Information Technology at the 
University of Zurich. 
5.2 Results 
I find that consumers’ demand for Munz, the product popular with the targets, is lower when 
targets are perceived to have undesirable moral values, as predicted by the model.33 Table 5, 
column (1) gives the estimates of a linear regression of the probability that consumers will 
choose the Munz chocolate when none of the products are bundled with money on a 
treatment dummy (1 = undesirable condition). Column (2) adds session fixed effects. In the 
																																																								
33 Six participants made product choices that are non-monotone in money. These individuals are excluded from the analysis. 




undesirable condition, consumers are estimated to be 13.6 percentage points less likely to 
choose the Munz chocolate than in the neutral condition (p = 0.036).  
 
Table 5: Relationship between consumers’ choices and targets’ types, Study 2 
Dependent variable Pr(Munz) WTP Munz 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 = undesirable 
condition 
-0.133**   
(-2.00) 















N 226 226 226 226 
Session fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2): Linear regressions of probability of choosing Munz chocolate when neither of the 
two products is connected with any payment on a treatment dummy. Robust standard errors are used. Columns 
(3) and (4): Tobit regressions (left-censored at CHF −3, n = 5; right-censored at CHF +3, n = 9) of willingness 
to pay (WTP) to receive the Munz chocolate instead of the Camille Bloch chocolate on a treatment dummy. The 
t statistics are in parentheses. ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
As in Study 1, the data allow me to calculate subjects’ willingness to pay to receive 
the Munz chocolate instead of the Camille Bloch chocolate. Note that this variable is left-
censored at CHF −3 (five observations) and right-censored at CHF 3 (nine observations). 
Appendix Figure A6 shows the cumulative distribution of the willingness to pay.  
Table 5, column (3) gives the estimates of a tobit regression of the willingness to pay 
on a treatment dummy. Column (4) adds session fixed effects. Consumers in the undesirable 
condition are willing to pay CHF 0.335 less for the product adopted by the targets than 
consumers in the neutral condition (p = 0.025). Note that the effect size is about 10% of the 
price of the chocolates.34 This is a substantial effect in comparison to European net margins 
for food processing and food retail, 6.76% and 1.67%, respectively (Damodaran, 2019).  
In summary, I show that the effect demonstrated in Study 1 replicates for 
unobservable consumption. In complement with Study 1, I thus provide evidence that type 
composition of products’ customer bases affects consumer behavior for both observable and 
																																																								
34 If a participant cannot eat chocolate, the choice will not reveal any information about that person’s type in this experiment. 
When I hire subjects, I thus ask students not to sign up for this study if they are allergic to chocolate. Nevertheless, 15 
students indicated in the survey that they could not eat either the Munz or the Camille Bloch chocolate. If I exclude these 
subjects from the analysis, treatment effects increase: Estimated treatment effects in Table 5 are then −0.166 (t = −2.43, p = 
0.016) for specification (1), −0.160 (t = −2.38, p = 0.018) for (2), −0.415 (t = −2.60, p = 0.010) for (3), and −0.413 (t = 




unobservable consumption. Importantly, this effect occurs for products that do not have 
recognizable properties that directly relate them to certain identities.  
6. Alternative explanations 
In both studies, I find that consumers care about the moral values of others who choose a 
product, as predicted by models of identity signaling. In the following, I discuss whether 
explanations other than identity signaling could produce my findings. Understanding the 
motives of consumer behavior is potentially important for the policy implications of my 
work; identity signaling, for example, often results in suboptimal consumption behaviors 
(Frank, 1985; Ireland, 1994; Moav and Neeman, 2010, 2012). Evaluating responses to the 
questionnaires and patterns in the choice data, I find that all explanations except identity 
signaling fail to explain the data.  
One alternative explanation is that the type compositions of products’ customer bases 
might have affected participants’ perceptions of the products or the producer, for example, 
through forms of social learning (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1998). Such 
differences in perception might then translate into differences in consumption choices.  
To investigate if there are treatment differences in product perceptions, I elicit 
participants’ perceptions of different dimensions of product quality (including price, 
processing quality, and quality of raw materials) and of the moral values of the producers in 
both studies. I do not find treatment differences in most dimensions of product quality (see 
Appendix Tables A6 and A7). Moreover, there are no treatment differences in the perception 
of the producers’ moral values: In Study 1, subjects do not think that the producer of the 
product that is adopted by the target with undesirable moral values promotes conservative 
Christian values (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p = 0.611; see Table A6). In Study 2, subjects in the 
undesirable condition do not think that Munz, the producer of the product adopted by right-
wing extremists, promotes right-wing extremism or discriminates against minorities 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum, p = 0.800, p = 0.406, respectively; see Table A7). 
Another explanation is that associating a product with right-wing extremists, as in 
Study 2, might remind the buyer of unpleasant associations with Nazis and their actions, 
resulting in feelings of disgust when consuming the product—in line with negative contagion 
(Rozin, Millman, and Nemeroff, 1986; Nemeroff and Rozin, 1994)—thereby devaluating the 
product. In the questionnaires, I ask subjects whether they feel disgusted when they think 




subjects’ responses in either Study 1 or Study 2 (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p = 0.967, p = 0.422, 
respectively; see Tables A6 and A7).35 
Third, people might be more willing to conform to the behaviors of others who have 
similar personality traits, values or group affiliations than to others who are different (Fatas, 
Hargreaves Heap and Rojo Arjona, 2018; Dimant, 2019). Treatment differences in the 
similarity between consumers and targets could therefore potentially explain the treatment 
differences in consumer behavior. 
My data allows me to measure the similarity between the moral values of consumers 
and targets. For Study 1, I look at the similarity in donations to Zukunft CH. For Study 2, I 
use subjects’ political position, racism and views on right-wing and left-wing extremism to 
measure similarity: subject that are right-wing and hold racist views are more similar to the 
right-wing extremists than subjects who hold left-wing views and are opposed to racism. In 
both studies, the similarity measures can not account for the treatment differences; if 
anything, controlling for similarity increases estimated treatment effects (see Appendix 
Tables A4 and A5).36 	
Finally, one might worry about experimenter demand effects, particularly given my 
use of right-wing extremists as undesirable types in Study 2.37 I note that this explanation is 
inconsistent with the fact that I find a treatment effect only for moral values in Study 1, and 
not for intelligence; if experimenter demand effects were present, they likely would occur in 
both the moral values round and the intelligence round. 
Moreover, I provide direct evidence against the importance of experimenter demand 
effects in the situations studied in this paper, based on the method developed by de Quidt, 
Haushofer, and Roth (2018). In the questionnaire of Study 2, subjects are asked to submit an 
offer (in [0 CHF, 6 CHF]) to buy a USB stick, incentivized by the Becker–DeGroot–
Marschak method. Half of the subjects are assigned to a demand condition and the other half 
to a control condition. In the demand condition, I add the sentence “We expect that 
																																																								
35 In the survey of Study 2, I also ask subjects how they plan to use the chocolates if they receive them: whether they will eat 
it, give it to someone else, or throw the chocolate away. If disgust plays an important role, subjects might be less likely to eat 
the Munz chocolate, but more likely to give it away or throw it away. I do not find a treatment difference in any of the three 
variables (linear probability model; t = 0.25 (p = 0.801), t = 1.54 (p = 0.126), t = −0.94 (p = 0.346), respectively). 
36 Moreover, in Study 1, the consumers in the undesirable condition are on average more similar to their targets than the 
consumers in the desirable condition: I measure similarity as 1 − |donation –  target’s donation|/6 and regress this variable 
on a dummy of being in the undesirable condition. The coefficient estimate is 0.16 (t = 2.99; p = 0.003). Figure A2 in the 
Appendix also illustrates that consumers are more similar to the undesirable targets than to the desirable targets. Therefore, if 
participants are more willing to conform to more similar targets, conformity should be more common in the undesirable 
condition than in the desirable condition. I find the opposite pattern. 
37 A related explanation is that consumers try to fulfill observers’ expectations. Like experimenter demand effects, this 
explanation is inconsistent with the fact that I find a treatment effect only for moral values in Study 1, and not for 




participants who are shown these instructions will specify a lower maximum price than they 
normally would.” As de Quidt, Haushofer, and Roth (2018) argue, such a sentence induces 
experimenter demand effects and makes it possible to test for the importance of experimenter 
demand effects in a specific setting. The average willingness to pay for the USB stick does 
not differ between treatment conditions (tobit regression, coefficient = CHF −0.034, t = 
−0.11, p = 0.916), suggesting that experimenter demand effects are weak for the kind of 
consumption choices studied in this paper.  
7. Conclusion 
Many firms appear to shun potential customers with undesirable moral values—for example, 
alt-right followers and hooligans—which seems at odds with the typical assumption that 
firms will seek to sell greater quantities of their products where profitable. This paper 
provides a potential rationale for such firm behavior, based on consumers’ image concerns: 
consumers seek to signal to themselves and others that they have desirable characteristics by 
avoiding products popular among people with undesirable characteristics and by conforming 
to the product choices of people with desirable characteristics. Thus, a firm urging 
undesirable groups not to buy the firm’s products might be entirely consistent with profit-
maximization, if the perceived negative impacts of such a customer base outweigh the 
immediate profits from such sales. A condition for such a relationship, however, is that 
consumers care about a product’s customer base and choose to avoid products that are 
disproportionately purchased by individuals with undesirable characteristics. 
I test whether this consumer motive to signal one’s type through consumption is 
sufficiently strong to drive purchasing behavior. In two laboratory experiments, I vary by 
treatment whether the customer base of a product consists of people with desirable or 
undesirable characteristics. I find that demand for a product is lower if its customer base 
consists of individuals with undesirable moral values. This is the case even when 
consumption is unobservable and can only serve as a self-signal. Hence, my findings indicate 
that firms can face incentives to purposefully shun customers with undesirable moral values. 
The paper also provides some evidence on the limits to such identity signaling. While 
study participants care about the moral values of products’ customer bases, they do not 
appear to care about the intelligence associated with a product’s customer base. This finding 
suggests that individuals care more about the public perception of their moral values than 
about the public perception of their intelligence when they make consumption choices. Future 




customer characteristics and explore the conditions under which signaling varied 
characteristics is relevant for purchasing behavior. The prevalence of gender marketing, for 
example, suggests that firms often care about the gender composition of products’ customer 
bases.38 Studying whether consumers seek to signal their masculinity or femininity through 
consumption seems to be a promising avenue for future research. 
A key aspect of my studies is that I investigate demand for products that do not have 
properties that are inherently related to specific desirable or undesirable characteristics. This 
stands in contrast to other forms of signaling whereby, for example, an expensive product 
signals high wealth or income or a product with positive social impact signals prosocial 
concern. In the settings I investigate, signals about a consumer’s characteristics emerge only 
through the types of customers who buy the product and are entirely unrelated to the products 
themselves. Hence, my findings indicate that products and brands can convey identities (or, 
“brand-images”) that shape their consumers’ images independently of any actual product 
characteristics.  
My findings might help explain why firms spend substantial amounts of money to 
attract people with desirable characteristics (e.g., celebrities) as visible consumers of their 
products. While in some cases an individual’s traits may convey information about a 
product’s quality—for instance, Michael Jordan endorsing Nike or Gatorade—but in other 
cases the informational value of a celebrity endorsement seems much less clear—Michael 
Jordan wearing Hanes underwear. My results provide an explanation of why such celebrity 
endorsement could nevertheless affect sales: creating the perception that a brand is popular 
among people with desirable characteristics allows individuals to signal to themselves and 
others that they share such positive characteristics by consuming the product.  
Relatedly, my work also suggests a potential policy tool for behavioral change. Where 
policy makers desire to change consumption behavior, perhaps away from undesirable 
products like cigarettes or unhealthy foods,39 one potential instrument might be to promote 
associations between such products and undesirable types.   
																																																								
38 An interesting example of such gender marketing are “pink taxes”: products targeted at women are more expensive than 
similar products targeted at men (Bessendorf and Gans, 2015). Identity signaling could explain price discrimination for 
homogeneous goods. 
39 Some social groups, for instance, consume unhealthy products (Guendelman, Cheryan, and Monin, 2011), foods with low 
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Appendix A: Additional results 
 
Figure A1: Distribution intelligence score, Study 1 
 
Notes: Distribution of the number correctly solved Raven’s matrices.  
 
Figure A2: Distribution moral values, Study 1 
 
Notes: Distribution of donations to Zukunft CH. (+6, +9) means that the subject chose the option that increases 

























Figure A3: Targets’ choices conditional on treatment condition, Study 1 
 
Notes: “Cup” gives the share of targets in each condition that chose the cup over the USB stick. “Camille 
Bloch Torino” gives the share of targets in each condition that chose the Camille Bloch Torino chocolate over 
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Figure A4: Treatment effects conditional on target choice, Study 1 
 
(a) pooled, probability to chose same product as 
the target (p joint test = 0.002) 
 
 (b) pooled, WTP to receive same product as the 
target (p joint test = 0.011) 
 
(c) intelligence, probability to chose same product 
as the target (p joint test = 0.128) 
 
(d) intelligence, WTP to receive same product as 
the target (p joint test = 0.117) 
 
(e) moral values, probability to chose same product 
as the target (p joint test = 0.006) 
 
(f) moral values, WTP to receive same product as 
the target (p joint test = 0.044) 
Notes: The bares in the figures give estimated treatment effects condition on targets’ choices. In figures (a), (c) 
and (e), the independent variable is the probability of choosing the same product as the target when neither of 
the two products is connected with any payment (linear probability model). In figures (b), (d) and (f), the 
independent variable is the willingness to pay (WTP) to receive the same product as the target instead of the 
other product (tobit model). Figures (a) and (b) show the estimates when the data from the intelligence and the 
moral values rounds are pooled, while figures (c) to (f) show effects for the intelligence and moral values data 
separately. Coefficients in figure (a) and coefficients in figure (b) are estimated jointly by interacting the 
treatment dummy with dummies for the targets’ choices. Moreover, coefficients for figures (c) and (e) and 
coefficients for figures (d) and (f) are estimated jointly by interacting the treatment dummy with dummies for the 
targets’ choices and a dummy for being in the moral values round. The numbers in brackets indicate the number 
of observations in this category. “p joint test” reports the p value of a joint test that all four coefficients in the 
figure are equal to zero. All regressions control for the choice of the target and session fixed effects. Intervals 






































































































































































Notes: Cumulative distributions of subjects willingness to pay to receive the product chosen by the target 
instead of the other product. (a) uses data from both rounds, (b) uses only data from the moral values round and 
(c) uses only data from the intelligence round. Distributions are statistically significantly different between 
treatment conditions for moral values (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, z = 2.98, p = 0.003), but not for intelligence (z 
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Figure A6: Distribution willingness to pay, Study 2 
 
Notes: Cumulative distributions of subjects willingness to pay to receive Munz product instead of the Camille 
Bloch product for both treatment conditions. Distributions are statistically significantly different between 
treatment conditions (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, z =	2.220, p = 0.0264). 
 
 
Table A1: Treatment effects in Study 1, robustness 
Dependent 
variable 
Pr(Conform to target) WTP for target’s product 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














Constant 0.624***   (16.09)   
0.085 
(0.83)   





N 308 308 308 308 308 308 
Session fixed 
effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Target choice 
controls No No Yes No No No 
Notes: Regressions show that results do not change if I keep the seven observations in which subjects made 
choices that are non-monotone in money. Columns (1)–(3): Linear regressions of probability of choosing the 
same product as the target when neither of the two products is connected with any payment on a treatment 
dummy, a constant, and, depending on the specification, session fixed effects and controls for the targets’ 
choices. Specifications include the non-monotone observations. Columns (4)–(6): Tobit regressions (left-
censored at CHF −3, n = 17; right-censored at CHF +3, n = 10) of willingness to pay (WTP) to receive the 
same product as the target instead of the other product on the same set of variables. Specifications include the 
non-monotone observations. Given that these observations have multiple switching points, it is unclear how to 
construct the WTP. I take the average of the WTPs calculated based on the first and on the last switching point. 
The t statistics are given in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at subject level (168 clusters). * p < 0.1; 
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Table A2: Treatment effects for intelligence and moral values in Study 1, robustness 
Dependent variable Pr(Conform to target) WTP for target’s product 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 = undesirable condition  













1 = undesirable condition  





























p value TE-M==TE-I 0.092 0.095 0.218 0.021 0.025 0.0422 
N 308 308 308 308 308 308 
Session fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Target choice controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: Regressions show that results do not change if I keep the seven observations in which subjects made 
choices that are non-monotone in money. Columns (1)–(3): Linear regressions of probability of choosing the 
same product as the target when neither of the two products is connected with any payment on the interaction 
between a treatment dummy and a dummy for being in the moral values round (TE-M), the interaction between 
a treatment dummy and a dummy for being in the intelligence round (TE-I), a dummy for being in the 
intelligence round, (1 = intelligence round), a constant, and, depending on the specification, session fixed 
effects and controls for the targets’ choices. Specifications include the non-monotone observations. Columns 
(4)–(6): Tobit regressions (left-censored at CHF −3, n = 17; right-censored at CHF +3, n = 10) of willingness 
to pay (WTP) to receive the same product as the target instead of the other product on the same set of 
independent variables. Specifications include the non-monotone observations. Given that these observations 
have multiple switching points, it is unclear how to construct the WTP. I take the average of the WTPs 
calculated based on the first and on the last switching point. The t statistics are in parentheses; standard errors 






Table A3: Treatment effects in Study 2, robustness 
Dependent 
variable 
Pr(Munz) WTP Munz 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  



















N 232 232 232 232 
Session fixed 
effects 
No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Regressions show that results do not change if I keep the six observations in which subjects made 
choices that are non-monotone in money. Columns (1) and (2): Linear regressions of probability of choosing 
Munz chocolate when neither of the two products is connected with any payment on a treatment dummy. 
Specifications include the non-monotone observations. Robust standard errors are used. Columns (3) and (4): 
Tobit regressions (left-censored at CHF −3, n = 5; right-censored at CHF +3, n = 9) of willingness to pay 
(WTP) to receive the Munz chocolate instead of the Camille Bloch chocolate on a treatment dummy. 
Specifications include the non-monotone observations. Given that these observations have multiple switching 
points, it is unclear how to construct the WTP. I take the average of the WTPs calculated based on the first and 





Table A4: Treatment effects and similarity, Study 1  
Dependent variable Pr(Conform to target) WTP for target’s product 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











Similarity moral values  









Similarity intelligence  









1 = undesirable condition  









1 = undesirable condition  














p value TE-M==TE-I  0.161 0.102  0.040 0.012 
N 301 301 301 301 301 301 
Session fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target choice controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Columns (1)–(3): Linear regressions of probability of choosing the same product as the target when 
neither of the two products is connected with any payment on a dummy for being in the intelligence round, (1 = 
intelligence round), a constant, session fixed effects, controls for the targets’ choices and, depending on the 
specification, the similarity between the consumer with her target for moral values and for intelligence, the 
interaction between a treatment dummy and a dummy for being in the moral values round (TE-M) and the 
interaction between a treatment dummy and a dummy for being in the intelligence round (TE-I). Columns (4)–
(6): Tobit regressions (left-censored at CHF −3, n = 17; right-censored at CHF +3, n = 10) of willingness to 
pay (WTP) to receive the same product as the target instead of the other product on the same set of independent 
variables. Similarity moral values is defined as “1-|donation – target’s donation|/6.” Similarity intelligence is 
defined as “1-|intelligence scores – target’s intelligence scores|/8.” Because similarity moral values is only 
important for the moral values round, and similarity intelligence is only important for the intelligence round, 
these measures are interacted with a dummy for being in the moral values round (1=moral values) and a 
dummy for being in the intelligence round (1=intelligence), respectively. The t statistics are in parentheses; 








Table A5: Treatment effects and similarity, Study 2 
Dependent variable: Pr(Munz) WTP Munz 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
Political position -0.181  (-0.90) 




   0.032 
(0.06) 
Right-wing extremism  0.113 (0.49) 




  0.557 
(0.97) 
Left-wing extremism   0.088 (0.55) 
 0.025 
(0.14) 




Racism    0.086 (0.17) 
0.220 
(0.45) 


























N 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 
Session Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Columns (1)–(5): Linear regressions of probability of choosing Munz chocolate when neither of the two products is connected with any payment on different measures 
of similarity and a treatment dummy. Robust standard errors are used. Columns (6)–(10): Tobit regressions (left-censored at CHF −3, n = 5; right-censored at CHF +3, n = 
9) of willingness to pay (WTP) to receive the Munz chocolate instead of the Camille Bloch chocolate on different measures of similarity and a treatment dummy. Political 
position is in between 0 (=very left-wing) and 1 (=very right-wing), with mean 0.463 (s.d. = 0.160). To measure right-wing (left-wing) extremism, subjects are asked how 
much they agree (from 1= strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree) with three statements that are typically accepted by right-wing (left-wing) extremists (items taken from 
Decker et al., 2016 and Deutz-Schroeder and Schroeder, 2016). I re-scaled the responses to lie on the 0 to 1 interval and averaged the three responses. The mean of right-
wing extremism is 0.103 (s.d. = 0.139) and the mean of left-wing extremism is 0.331 (s.d. = 0.216). To measure racism, subjects are asked how much they agree with seven 
statements related to racism, adopted from the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986). I re-scaled the responses to lie on the 0 to 1 interval and averaged the three 






Table A6: Perception of the products, Study 1 
(a) Intelligence and moral values 
 Camille Bloch/Munz Cup/USB Stick 
Product chosen by target,  
mean rating 
Product not chosen by target, 
mean rating 
Product chosen by target, 
 mean rating 
Product not chosen by target, 

























What do you think, how much does 
the product currently cost? (in CHF) 3.94 3.88 
0.442 
(0.658) 
3.88 3.70 1.003 
(0.316) 
8.71 7.56 1.519 
(0.129) 
7.56 7.26 0.181 
(0.856) 
How good is the quality of the raw 
materials used? (1 = "very low 













How well is the product processed? 














When you think about using/eating 
the product, are you disgusted?  
(1 = "very disgusted"; 5 = "not 


















(b) Moral values only 
 Camille Bloch/Munz Cup/USB Stick 
Product chosen by target, 
 mean rating 
Product not chosen by target, 
mean rating 
Product chosen by target, 
 mean rating 


























What do you think, how much does 
the product currently cost? (in CHF) 3.95 3.95 
0.461 
(0.645) 
3.99 3.73 0.948 
(0.343) 
8.37 7.35 1.170 
(0.242) 
7.57 7.31 0.094 
(0.925) 
How good is the quality of the raw 
materials used? (1 = "very low 
quality"; 5 = "very high quality") 
3.75 3.58 0.420 
(0.674) 
3.71 3.42 1.058 
(0.290) 
3.10 2.93 0.859 
(0.390) 
3.20 2.98 0.826 
(0.409) 
How well is the product processed? 
(1 = "very low quality"; 5 = "very 
high quality") 
3.79 3.62 0.814 
(0.416) 
3.75 3.42 1.238 
(0.216) 
3.29 3.13 0.765 
(0.444) 
3.31 3.13 0.836 
(0.403) 
When you think about using/eating 
the product, are you disgusted?  
(1 = "very disgusted"; 5 = "not 













Does the producer of the good 
promote conservative Christian values 
(e.g, fighting abortions and marriage 
for same-sex couples)? (1 = "yes, 


















(c) Intelligence only 
 Camille Bloch/Munz Cup/USB Stick 
Product chosen by target, 
 mean rating 
Product not chosen by target, 
mean rating 
Product chosen by target,  
mean rating 


























What do you think, how much does 
the product currently cost? (in CHF) 3.93 3.84 
0.233 
(0.816) 
3.81 3.68 0.552 
(0.581) 
9.29 7.92 0.963 
(0.336) 
7.54 7.18 0.178 
(0.859) 
How good is the quality of the raw 
materials used? (1 = "very low 
quality"; 5 = "very high quality") 
3.68 3.49 1.528 
(0.126) 
3.60 3.17 2.310 
(0.021) 
3.29 3.15 0.685 
(0.493) 
3.29 3.22 0.280 
(0.780) 
How well is the product processed? 
(1 = "very low quality"; 5 = "very 
high quality") 
3.82 3.70 1.215 
(0.224) 
3.76 3.47 1.847 
(0.065) 
3.39 3.37 0.203 
(0.839) 
3.54 3.19 1.661 
(0.097) 
When you think about using/eating 
the product, are you disgusted?  
(1 = "very disgusted"; 5 = "not 


















Table A7: Perception of the products, Study 2 

















What do you think, how much does a pack of Camille 
Bloch Torino (Munz) chocolate bars currently cost at 
Migros? (in CHF) 
3.88 4.01 -0.559 (0.576) 3.77 3.9 
-0.757 
(0.449) 
 How healthy are the products? 
(1 = "very unhealthy"; 5 = "very healthy") 1.94 1.94 
-0.027 
(0.978) 1.9 1.95 
-0.518 
(0.604) 
 How long can you store them? 
(1 = " spoils soon "; 5 = "long storage life") 4.39 4.26 
1.333 
(0.182) 4.42 4.23 
1.997 
(0.046) 
 How good is the quality of the raw materials used? 
(1 = "very low quality"; 5 = "very high quality") 3.5 3.47 
0.166 
(0.868) 3.41 3.46 
-0.389 
(0.697) 
 How sustainable are the raw materials used? 
(1 = "very sustainable"; 5 = "not sustainable at all") 3.38 3.22 
1.430 
(0.153) 3.41 3.22 
1.670 
(0.095) 
What is the quality of the processing? 
(1 = "very low quality"; 5 = "very high quality") 3.68 3.78 
-0.872 
(0.383) 3.55 3.64 
-1.159 
(0.247) 
When you think about eating the Camille Bloch (Munz) 
chocolate, are you digusted? 
(1 = "very disgusted"; 5 = "not disgusted at all") 
4.34 4.44 -0.693 (0.488) 4.46 4.6 
-0.803 
(0.422) 






















If you were to eat the chocolate in public, would people 
associate you with right-wing extremism? 
(1 = "Yes, for sure"; 5 = "No, certainly not") 
4.93 4.86 -0.024 (0.981) 4.89 4.82 
0.625 
(0.532) 
If you were to eat the chocolate in front of your family or 
friends, would you associate it with right-wing 
extremism? 
(1 = "Yes, for sure"; 5 = "No, certainly not") 
4.95 4.91 0.276 (0.782) 4.93 4.89 
-0.031 
(0.975) 
What do you think, does Camille Bloch (Munz) in any 
way promote right-wing extremism (for example, through 
party donations, employment of right-wing extremists, 
public support for right-wing extremist ideals)? 
(1 = "Yes, very strong"; 5 = "No, not at all") 
4.39 4.45 -0.547 (0.585) 4.39 4.34 
0.254 
(0.800) 
What do you think, does Camille Bloch (Munz) in any 
way discriminate against minorities (for example, in the 
recruitment, payment and promotion of employees)? 
(1 = "Yes, very strong"; 5 = "No, not at all") 
3.96 4.12 -1.445 (0.149) 3.97 4.04 
-0.831 
(0.406) 




Appendix B: A simple model of identity signaling through consumption 
In this Appendix, I introduce a simple model to guide my investigation, building on 
Bernheim (1994) and Bénabou and Tirole (2011). Note that I do not attempt to provide a 
novel theoretical contribution, but rather use simple economic analysis to guide my empirical 
investigation. 
A critical feature of the model and the situations that I study is that individuals 
possess individual characteristics, or types, that are relevant to their self- or social image. For 
example, they may differ in terms of moral values. Individuals have undesirable, “neutral,” or 
desirable characteristics, associated with image 𝑣! < 𝑣! < 𝑣!. Individuals have imperfect 
knowledge about others’ types but can potentially receive signals through observing these 
others’ consumption. An individual’s social image, 𝐸 𝑣 𝑥 , is, therefore, the expected value 
of that person’s image conditional on that person’s consumption choice, 𝑥. 
Individuals choose between two products, A and B. I study contexts in which 
individuals with either undesirable or desirable characteristics, which I refer to as the targets, 
adopt product A. Undesirable targets may be, for example, right-wing extremists. I then 
investigate how the desirability of targets’ characteristics affects the popularity of the product 
among others with relatively “neutral” characteristics, whom I label the consumers. 
Consumers may be, for example, the general population. I compare a situation in which 
targets have desirable characteristics with a situation in which targets have undesirable 
characteristics. 
Formally, I consider a population of decision makers, normalized to [0,1], each of 
whom chooses between two products, A and B. Choices are publicly observable. Decision 
makers differ in their taste (or, consumption utility), 𝑢, and in their characteristics that shape 
their image, 𝑣. Each decision makers has a type 𝑡 ∈ 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 . Both 𝑎- and 𝑏-types have 
“neutral” characteristics (𝑣!), but differ in their taste: 𝑎-types derive more consumption 
utility from A and 𝑏-types derive more consumption utility from B. Specifically, I assume 
that 𝑢! 𝐴 − 𝑢! 𝐵 = 𝑢! 𝐵 − 𝑢! 𝐴 = ∆𝑢 > 0. I will refer to the combination of the 𝑎- 
and 𝑏 -types as consumers. The targets are either assumed to have desirable (𝑣! ) or 
undesirable (𝑣!) characteristics, and receive more consumption utility from product A. All 
targets choose product A.40 While types are private information, the distribution of types is 
																																																								
40 There are multiple assumptions that can rationalize such behavior. For example, targets can be assumed to receive 
substantially more consumption utility from product A than from product B (𝑢!"#$%! 𝐴 − 𝑢!"#$%! 𝐵 > 𝜃!"#$%! ∗




common knowledge and described by Pr 𝑎 = 𝛿, Pr 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 = 𝛾 and Pr 𝑏 = 1− 𝛾 − 𝛿, 
with 𝛿, 𝛾 > 0 and 𝛿 + 𝛾 < 1.  
The consumers care about the public perception of their type. They maximize 
𝑢! 𝑥 + 𝜃𝐸 𝑣 𝑥 , where 𝜃 > 0 is the weight they put on their social image and 𝑢!(𝑥) is the 
consumption utility from product 𝑥. A consumer’s social image is the expected value of her 
image conditional on her choice, 𝑥: 𝐸 𝑣 𝑥 = 𝜌 𝑥 𝑣!"#$%! + 1− 𝜌 𝑥 𝑣!, where 𝑣!"#$%! 
is the targets’ image (𝑣! or 𝑣!) and 𝜌 𝑥  is the probability that an individual is a target given 
her choice 𝑥. This probability is calculated by applying Bayes’ rule:41 
𝜌 𝐴 =
𝛾𝑥!"#$%!
𝛿𝑥! + 1− 𝛾 − 𝛿 𝑥! + 𝛾𝑥!"#$%! =
𝛾
𝛿𝑥! + 1− 𝛾 − 𝛿 𝑥! + 𝛾 
𝜌 𝐵 =
𝛾(1− 𝑥!"#$%!)
1−𝛿𝑥!− 1− 𝛾 − 𝛿 𝑥! − 𝛾𝑥!"#$%! = 0, 
where 𝑥! is the probability that a consumer with type t chooses product A.  
This model can also be interpreted as a self-signaling model, following Bénabou and 
Tirole (2011). For this alternative interpretation, players have imperfect knowledge of their 
own types. Consumers’ past choices are then signals about their own type. There are two 
periods. In period 0, the consumer “obtains a momentary insight into his true nature,” 
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2011) and temporarily learns his type. Then, he makes his choice. In 
period 1, the consumer remembers his type 𝑡 with probability 1− 𝜃, with probability 𝜃 the 
consumer has no direct access to the motivation behind his behavior in period 0 (that is, his 
type), and only remembers his choice, x. In the latter case, therefore, his self-image 
corresponds to 𝐸(𝑣|𝑥). In period 0, the consumer cares about his consumption utility and his 
expected self-image in period 1: he maximizes 𝑢! 𝑥 + (1− 𝜃)𝑣! + 𝜃𝐸(𝑣|𝑥) . This 
consumer problem corresponds to the consumer problem discussed before. Note that the key 
requirement for self-signaling to occur is 𝜃>0, that is, that consumers are insecure about their 
own type. 
I follow Bénabou and Tirole (2011) by restricting attention to monotonic	 Perfect 
Bayesian equilibria. In a monotonic equilibrium, 𝑥! = 𝑥! = 𝑥!"#$%! = 1 implies 𝜌 𝐵 = 0. 
The Lemma shows that an equilibrium exist, but it might not be unique. 
 
																																																								
41 Note that 𝜌 𝐵  is not defined for 𝑥! = 𝑥! = 1. I restrict attention to monotonic Perfect Bayesian equilibria, which implies 




Lemma. If targets have desirable characteristics, there exists a unique monotonic	 Perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium. If targets have undesirable characteristics, there are in between one 
and three monotonic	Perfect Bayesian equilibria. 
 
Proof: I will first derive the equilibria for the case that the targets have undesirable 
characteristics. Note that 𝑥!"#$%! = 1 and the restriction to monotonic equilibria implies that 
𝜌 𝐵 = 0  and therefore 𝑥! = 0 . The 𝑎 -types choose A iff ∆𝑢 ≥ 𝜌 𝐴 𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣!  with 
𝜌 𝐴 = !
!!!!!
. There are three potential equilibria: 
• 𝑥! = 0. In this case, 𝜌 𝐴 = 1. This equilibrium exists iff ∆𝑢 ≤ 𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣! . 
• 𝑥! = 1.  In this case, 𝜌 𝐴 = !
!!!
. This equilibrium exists iff 
∆𝑢 ≥ !
!!!
𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣! . 
• 𝑥! ∈ 0,1 . In this case, 𝜌 𝐴 = !
!!!!!




𝑣! − 𝑣! − 1 . This 
equilibrium exists iff !
!!!
𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣! < ∆𝑢 < 𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣! . 
Note that for each value of ∆𝑢  there exists at least one monotone Perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium, and at most three equilibria.42 
Next, I will derive the equilibria for the case that the targets have desirable 
characteristics. Note that 𝑥!"#$%! = 1 and the restriction to monotonic equilibria implies that 
𝜌 𝐵 = 0  and therefore 𝑥! = 1 . The 𝑏 -types choose B iff ∆𝑢 ≥ 𝜌 𝐴 𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣!  with 
𝜌 𝐴 = !
!! !!!!! (!!!! )
. There are three potential equilibria: 
• 𝑥! = 0 . In this case, 𝜌 𝐴 = !
!!!
. This equilibrium exists iff 
∆𝑢 ≥ !
!!!
𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣!  
• 𝑥! = 1. In this case, 𝜌 𝐴 = 𝛾. This equilibrium exists iff ∆𝑢 ≤ 𝛾𝜃 𝑣! −
𝑣! . 
																																																								
42 The number of equilibria could be reduced by restricting attention to undominated equilibria, as Bénabou & Tirole (2011) 
do. This equilibrium refinement criterion eliminates equilibria that are Pareto-dominated (weakly lower payoffs for all types, 
and a strictly lower payoff for at least one of them). The equilibria would then be given by: 𝑥! = 0 for ∆𝑢 < 𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣! , 
𝑥! ∈ 0,1  for ∆𝑢 = 𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣!  and 𝑥! = 1 for ∆𝑢 > 𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣! . If in addition the targets are assumed to care about 
their image (but assuming that 𝑥!"#$%! = 1 still holds), the equilibrium 𝑥! = 0 for ∆𝑢 = 𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣!  would be Pareto-




• 𝑥! ∈ 0,1 .  In this case, 𝜌 𝐴 = !
!! !!!!! (!!!! )
 and 𝑥! =
!! !!!!! !∆!(!!!)
∆! !!!!!
. This equilibrium exists iff 𝛾𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣! < ∆𝑢 <
!
!!!
𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣! .  
Note that for each value of ∆𝑢 there exists a unique monotone equilibrium. ∎ 
 
In the following, I investigate how the share of consumers that choose A, 𝑥!∪! =
!!!!(!!!!!)!!
!!!
, depends on the desirability of targets’ characteristics. I refer to the shares for 
desirable and undesirable targets as 𝑥!!∪! and 𝑥!!∪!, respectively. Suppose that the targets 
have desirable characteristics. Choosing product A then increases a consumer’s image (i.e., 
𝐸 𝑣 𝐴 > 𝐸 𝑣 𝐵 ). For the 𝑎-types, there is thus no trade-off between consumption utility 
and image, so 𝑥! = 1. If the 𝑏-types are sufficiently concerned about their social image, they 
also choose A. Figure B1(i) illustrates this case from the perspective of the  𝑏-types. These 
behaviors imply that 𝑥!!∪! ≥
!
!!!
. Suppose now that the targets have undesirable 
characteristics. Conforming to the targets’ consumption choices then decreases consumers’ 
social image (𝐸 𝑣 𝐴 < 𝐸 𝑣 𝐵 ). Hence, the 𝑏 -types  do not face a trade-off between 
consumption utility and image and choose B, so 𝑥! = 0. The 𝑎-types might also choose 
product B, and, therefore, 𝑥!!∪! ≤
!
!!!
. In summary, 𝑥!!∪! ≤ 𝑥!!∪!, that is, consumers choose 
product A weakly more often if it is adopted by targets with desirable characteristics than if it 
is adopted by targets with undesirable characteristics.  
 
Figure B1: Game for desirable and undesirable characteristics 
 
(i) desirable characteristics    (ii) undesirable characteristics 
 
Nature 
𝑡 = 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑡 = 𝑎 𝑡 = 𝑏 
					𝛾     𝛿            1 − 𝛾 − 𝛿 
𝑥 = 𝐴 𝑥 = 𝐵 
𝑥!  1 − 𝑥!  
Nature 
𝑡 = 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑡 = 𝑎 𝑡 = 𝑏 
				𝛾      𝛿           1 − 𝛾 − 𝛿 
𝑥 = 𝐴 𝑥 = 𝐵 




Notes: Boxes show observers’ information sets. Note that for desirable characteristics, 𝑎-types do not face a 
tradeoff between consumption utility and image utility and therefore 𝑥! = 1. For undesirable characteristics, 
the same is true for 𝑏-types, 𝑥! = 0. 
 
The Proposition shows that this inequality holds strictly as long as consumers are 
sufficiently concerned about their social image, relative to ∆𝑢. Given that there can be 
multiple equilibria for the undesirable target, the Proposition compares 𝑥!!∪!  with 
max(𝑥!!∪!).  
 
Proposition. The relationship between 𝑥!!∪! and 𝑥!!∪! is characterized by a threshold 𝜃 such 
that 𝑥!!∪!  > max 𝑥!!∪!  if 𝜃 > 𝜃  and 𝑥!!∪!  = max (𝑥!!∪!) =
!
!!!
 if 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃 . Furthermore, 𝜃 
is increasing in ∆𝑢. 
 
Proof: If the targets have undesirable characteristics, the results proofed in the Lemma imply 
that the share of 𝑎 - and 𝑏-types that choose product A is: 
𝑥!!∪! =
0 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑢 <
𝛾
𝛿 + 𝛾












𝜃 𝑣𝑀 − 𝑣𝐿 , 𝜃 𝑣𝑀 − 𝑣𝐿
𝛿
1 − 𝛾






! − 𝑣! − 1 ≤ !
!!!
 for ∆𝑢 ≥ !
!!!
𝜃 𝑣𝑀 − 𝑣𝐿 . Therefore, max (𝑥!!∪!)=0 for 
∆𝑢 < !
!!!
𝜃 𝑣𝑀 − 𝑣𝐿  and max (𝑥!!∪!)= 
!
!!!
 for ∆𝑢 ≥ !
!!!
𝜃 𝑣𝑀 − 𝑣𝐿 . Figure B2 illustrates 
how 𝑥!!∪! depends on ∆𝑢. 
If the targets have desirable characteristics, the results proofed in the Lemma imply 
that the share of 𝑎 - and 𝑏-types that choose product A is: 
𝑥!!∪! =





! − 𝑣! − 1 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑢 ∈ 𝛾𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣! ,
𝛾













𝑣! − 𝑣! − 1 > !
!!!
 for ∆𝑢 < !
!!!
𝜃 𝑣! − 𝑣! .  Figure B2 illustrates how 




Define  ∆𝑢 = 𝜃 !
!!!
max (𝑣! − 𝑣! , 𝑣! − 𝑣!) and note that  𝑥!!∪! > max (𝑥!!∪!) for 
∆𝑢 < ∆𝑢,  that 𝑥!!∪! = max (𝑥!!∪!) =
𝛿
1−𝛾
 for ∆𝑢 ≥ ∆𝑢 . To finish the proof, note that  











Note: 𝑥! + 𝑥! for desirable and undesirable characteristics. Parameters: 𝛾 = 𝛿 = 1/3, 𝑣! − 𝑣! = 𝑣! − 𝑣! =















Appendix C: Results from the additional surveys 
C.1 Perception Zukunft CH, Study 1 
To elicit participants’ perception of Zukunft CH and to decide on several aspects of Study 1’s 
design, I implemented an online survey. I recruit 29 participants, drawn from the same 
subject pool from which I recruit participants for Study 1.  
 
Figure C1: Participants dislike being publicly perceived as donors to Zukunft CH 
 
(a) increase the donation the most  (b) reduced the donation the most 
Notes: Participants in an online survey (N=29) are asked to rate how much they would like it if other 
participants in a hypothetical laboratory experiment would receive information that makes them believe that 
“you are the participant who increased the donation to Zukunft CH the most,” or information that make them 
believe that “you are the participant who reduced the donation to Zukunft CH the most.” Figure C1a (C1b) 
shows the distribution of responses the first (second) question. 
 
The online survey consists of three parts. In Part 1, subjects repeatedly choose 
between pairs of products. The choice sets include those used in Study 1. As in Study 1, 
consumers make 13 decisions between product-and-money bundles (see Table 2 in Section 
4.1.2). In Part 2, subjects make choices in four choice situations designed to measure their 
moral values, including the one used in Study 1 (see Section 4.1.1). In all choice situations, 
participants face tradeoffs between their own payoff and a donation to an organization 
(Zukunft CH, ProTell, UNICEF, FAIRMED). In Part 3, subjects rate whether they like or 
dislike it if they would be publicly associated with these organizations, including Zukunft 
CH. Specifically, they are asked how much they would like it (from 1 = dislike a great deal to 
7 = like a great deal) if other participants in a hypothetical laboratory experiment would 
receive information that makes them believe that “you are the participant who increased the 
donation to Zukunft CH the most,” or information that make them believe that “you are the 























































distribution of responses to both questions. Participants disliked being publicly associated 
with Zukunft CH: I can reject the hypothesis that the two distributions are equal (Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test, z = −3.702, p = 0.0002). 
C.2 Survey with right-wing extremists, Study 2 
In Study 2, targets are played by right-wing extremists (see Section 5.1.1). I collect 
consumption data from 10 right-wing extremists who are recruited on far-right extremist 
internet forums to participate in a short online survey. The survey consists of eight binary 
product choices. For the purpose of my study, it is essential that one product be adopted by 
most of the right-wing extremists. To achieve this requirement, I select products with 
incidental connections to symbols liked (or disliked) by right-wing extremists, likely 
increasing (or decreasing) the attractiveness of products. Table C1 shows the eight choice 
situations and highlights all symbols that may make a product more attractive (blue) or less 
attractive (red) for right-wing extremists. The table also gives the distribution of extremists’ 
choices (column “Share right” gives the share of participants that chose the “Right option”). 
 
Table C1: Presentation of product choices to right-wing extremists 
Left option  
(unattractive for right-wing extremists) 
Right option  
(attractive for right-wing extremists) 
Share 
right 
Pack Camille Bloch Torino 
5 x 23g (Art. Nr. 3000652) 
 
Pack Munz Praliné-Prügeli Milch 
5 x 23g (Art. Nr. 3928213) 
 
0.9 
Intenso Rainbow Line 4GB USB Stick 
Blau (Art. Nr. 3502450) 
 
Butlers HENKELBECHER KREUZ 






Intenso Rainbow Line 4GB USB Stick 
Blau (Art. Nr. 3502450) 
 
Kahla Tasse 0,18l 
Rot-Weiss (Art Nr. 27508877) 
 
0.6 
Kahla Colore Tasse 0,25l 
Grau (Art Nr. 204708A70705C) 
 
Butlers HENKELBECHER KREUZ 
Grau (Art Nr. 10210598) 
 
0.2 
Kahla Colore Tasse 0,25l 
Schokobraun (Art Nr. 204708A72605C) 
 
Kahla Tasse 0,18l 
Rot-Weiss (Art Nr. 27508877) 
 
0.7 
Intenso Rainbow Line 8GB USB Stick 
Grün (Art. Nr. 3502460) 
 
Butlers HENKELBECHER KREUZ 







Kahla Colore Tasse 0,25l 
Schokobraun (Art Nr. 204708A72605C) 
 
Butlers HENKELBECHER KREUZ 
Grau (Art Nr. 10210598) 
 
0.3 
Intenso Rainbow Line 8GB USB Stick 
Grün (Art. Nr. 3502460) 
 
Intenso Rainbow Line 4GB USB Stick 
Blau (Art. Nr. 3502450) 
 
0.2 
Notes: column “Share right” gives the share of participants that chose the “Right option.” The colors show the 
symbols that might make a product more attractive (red) or less attractive (blue) with right-wing extremists. 
Camille Bloch Torino, is produced by a firm founded by a Jewish family (Bloch). “Milch,” German for milk, is 
a symbol of the alt-right. “Rainbow” and “Schokobraun” (=chocolate brown) are symbols of cultural diversity 
(however, brown is also the color of the Nazi Party, besides black-white-red). “HENKELBECHER KREUZ” 
sounds similar as “Hakenkreuz” (=swastika), “Rot-Weiss” (=red-white) are the colors of the Swiss flag, and 88 
is a well known Nazi symbol. In the last choice situation, the left option dominates the right option, if one 
abstracts from the color difference. I added this option for potential future research on potential limits of 
identity signaling. 
 
C.3 Measure product perceptions, Study 2 
In an online survey, I document that the products used in Study 2 are not associated with 
right-wing political attitudes. I recruit 22 participants, drawn from the same subject pool from 
which I recruit participants for Study 2.  
Participants rate how useful and how popular different products (including those used 
in Study 2) are for different groups of people: managers, construction worker, students, 
accountants, neo-Nazis, left-wing extremists, men and women. While I am only interested in 
the neo-Nazi ratings, I add the other groups to make the survey feel more natural and to avoid 
demand effects. I also ask participants whether they associate the products’ consumers with a 
particular political position (left-wing extremist, left-wing, center, right-wing, right-wing 
extremist, no relation to political position).  
Figure C2 shows that participants neither associate Munz (or Camille Bloch) with 
right-wing extremism nor think that Munz is more useful to or more popular with neo-Nazis 




Figure C2: Associations of chocolates with right-wing extremists 












(c) With which political position would you associate a person that consumes the product? 





Notes: Answers to an online survey with 21 participants. In figures (c), “No association” was labeled as “I 















































































Appendix D: Instructions 
D.1 Instructions Study 1 
D.1.1 Overview (on screen) 




According to the scientific standards of the Laboratory for Behavioral and Experimental 
Economics, we are not allowed to lie to you or mislead you at any time. All the information 




Please do not talk to other participants and do not use your mobile phone throughout the 
study. If you violate these rules, we have to exclude you from the study and cannot pay you. 
  
Questions 
If you have questions at any time during the study, please raise your hand. We will come to 
your place and answer your questions individually. 
 
Payment 
You will receive a fixed payment of CHF 10 for participation. You will earn additional 
money during the experiment, and you will receive a real product that you will select during 





D.1.2 Measuring intelligence and moral values (on screen) 
 





Part 1 consists of two different tasks.  
 
Other study participants might receive some information about your choices in Part 1. 
However, these participants will only receive information that informs them of the likelihood 
that you made a particular choice, but this information will not reveal your choice with 









Part 1: Intelligence test 
 
In this task, you will complete an established test that is regularly used to measure general 
intelligence. 
 
You will not learn your score on the intelligence test. 
 
You will see patterns in which one part is missing. You are then given 8 possible suggestions 
for how to complete the pattern. Your task is to choose the suggestion that you think best 
completes the pattern. 
 
You will see a total of 14 patterns. The first two patterns are for training. For these training 
patterns, you have as much time as you want to make your decision. 
 
Afterwards you will have 12 minutes to complete the remaining 12 patterns. Once you have 
made your decision for one pattern, you will proceed to the next pattern and will not be able 
to go back. 
 
For every correctly completed pattern, you earn 0.50 CHF. Overall, you can therefore earn an 
additional 6.00 CHF. 
 




[Intelligence test is implemented] 
 
Part 1: Donation 
 
Your decision in the second task of Part 1 will determine the amount of a donation to Zukunft 
CH, a non-profit conservative Christian organization. 
 





  Zukunft CH 
 
Zukunft CH is a conservative Christian organization. Their members fight “the sneaking 
introduction of the sharia” and marriage for same-sex couples. Furthermore, they advocate 
conversion therapies for homosexuals and engage in demonstrations against abortions. 
 
On their official website, they write, for example, that every Muslim is committed to the 
holy war, be it through endeavor, migration, birth or terror. They also argue that same-sex 
marriage is against nature and the very concept of marriage. 
 
Zukunft CH has significant political impact. For example, Zukunft CH has recently 
published its own teaching material for children's sex education. They criticize that 
"mainstream sexual education" is too explicit and makes the children vulnerable to abuse. 
The material contains many controversial statements, including the claim that masturbation 
leads to addiction. While professionals do not recommend the use of this material in schools, 
it cannot be banned. 
 
In this choice situation, you receive an initial endowment of CHF 6.00. You can increase 
your payment by authorizing the researchers to make a donation to Zukunft CH on your 
behalf. The donation would be anonymous, that is, your name would not be mentioned, and 
the donated money would not be subtracted from your payment. 
 
Alternatively, you can give up a part of your endowment to decrease the donation to Zukunft 
CH. That is, you may decrease your payment by preventing donations from other participants 
from being implemented. 
 
You have to choose one of the following seven options: 
 
Options In addition to the CHF 6.00 
endowment, you receive 
Donation to 
Zukunft CH 
Option 1 +6.00 +9.00 
Option 2 +4.00 +6.00 
Option 3 +2.00 +3.00 
Option 4 +0.00 +0.00 
Option 5 -2.00 -3.00 
Option 6 -4.00 -6.00 
Option 7 -6.00 -9.00 
 
Examples: If you chose option 1, you receive a payment of 12.00 CHF (= CHF 6.00 + CHF 
6.00) in this choice situation, and you increase the donation to Zukunft CH by CHF 9.00. If 
you chose option 6 instead, you receive CHF 2.00 (= CHF 6.00 - CHF 4.00), and you reduce 
the donation to Zukunft CH by CHF 6.00. 
 





Options In addition to the CHF 6.00 
endowment, you receive 
Your donation 
to Zukunft CH 
o +6.00 +9.00 
o +4.00 +6.00 
o +2.00 +3.00 
o +0.00 +0.00 
o -2.00 -3.00 
o -4.00 -6.00 








You are finished with Part 1 of the experiment. You will now start with Part 2. 
  
Part 2 consists of three stages: 
 
Stage 1. The computer picks the participant that had the lowest intelligence 
score in today’s session. This participant choses between two products. 
Let us call the two products Product A and Product B.  
Then, you learn which product this participant with the lowest 
intelligence score chose. 
Stage 2.  You choose between Product A and Product B. 
Stage 3. Other participants receive information about your choice, linked to 
your portrait picture. They are also informed which choice was made 
by the participant with the lowest intelligence score. Depending on 
your choice, they may or may not belief that this participant is you. 
In the following, all three stages are explained in detail. You find a blank sheet and a pen on 
your table to make notes, if you wish to do so. 
 
 
Stage 1: The choice of the participant with the lowest intelligence score 
 
Remember that in Part 1, all participants did a test to measure their intelligence. The 
computer will select the participant that has the lowest intelligence score among all 
participants. (If two or more participants have the lowest intelligence score, one is randomly 
drawn.) This participant choses between Product A and Product B.  
 
Then, you will learn which choice was made by this participant. 
	
	
Stage 2: your choice 
 






If you have any questions about the instructions for Stage 1 and Stage 2, please raise your 
hand to get assistance. Otherwise, please click the [OK] button and proceed with the 





Understanding questions Stage 1 and Stage 2 
 




1) Before you choose between Product A and Product B, you will observe the choice of: 
○ a randomly drawn participant  
○ the participant with the lowest intelligence score 
 
 
2) Consider the following example. This example is purely hypothetical; it is not based on 
actual choices of participants. 
 
Stage 1: Suppose the participant with the lowest intelligence score chooses Product A. 
 
Stage 2: You learn the choice of the participant with the lowest intelligence score. Suppose 
that you make the following choices: 
 
Case Which product do you choose for the respective case ? 
1 ● Product A + 3.00 CHF ○ Product B 
2 ● Product A + 2.50 CHF ○ Product B 
3 ● Product A + 2.00 CHF ○ Product B 
4 ○ Product A + 1.50 CHF ● Product B 
5 ○ Product A + 1.00 CHF ● Product B 
6 ○ Product A + 0.50 CHF ● Product B 
7 ○ Product A ● Product B 
8 ○ Product A ● Product B + 0.50 CHF 
9 ○ Product A ● Product B + 1.00 CHF 
10 ○ Product A ● Product B + 1.50 CHF 
11 ○ Product A ● Product B + 2.00 CHF 
12 ○ Product A ● Product B + 2.50 CHF 
13 ○ Product A ● Product B + 3.00 CHF 
  
 
2a) Suppose that case 3 is drawn to count (drawn case).  
 
Which product does the participant with the lowest intelligence score receive? 





Which product do you receive? 
○ Product A  ○ Product B 
 
Which “linked additional monetary payment” do you receive?  
____ 0.00 CHF ____ 0.50 CHF ____ 1.00 CHF ____ 1.50 CHF ____ 2.00 CHF ____ 2.50 
CHF ____ 3.00 CHF 
 
2b) Suppose that case 4 is drawn to count (drawn case).  
 
Which product does the participant with the lowest intelligence score receive? 
○ Product A  ○ Product B 
 
Which product do you receive? 
○ Product A  ○ Product B 
 
Which “linked additional monetary payment” do you receive?  
____ 0.00 CHF ____ 0.50 CHF ____ 1.00 CHF ____ 1.50 CHF ____ 2.00 CHF ____ 2.50 






Part 2 consists of three stages. So far, we explained Stage 1 and Stage 2 to you. Now, we 
explain Stage 3 to you. 
 
Stage 3: Your choice is revealed to others 
 
At the end of the experiment, 14 other participants, the observers, each see the picture and 
the choice of one participant in today’s session.  
 
For each observer, the computer flips a (virtual) coin: 
 
• With a probability of 50% heads comes up, and the observer sees the picture and the 
choice of the participant with the lowest intelligence score. 
• With a probability of 50% tails comes up, and the observer sees your picture and your 
choice for one of the 13 cases that is randomly drawn, the drawn case.  
 
Note that the observers only learn your choice for the randomly drawn case. Also, they do 
not learn the monetary payment that (potentially) was linked with your choice. 
 
Importantly, the computer will not tell the observers whether heads or tails came up.  
However, in addition to observing a choice linked to a picture, all observers learn which 
product the person with the lowest intelligence score chose. That is, observers always 
observe a picture and the choice (A or B) made by the person in the picture, and they also 
know the choice made by the person with the lowest intelligence score. 
 









NOTE: These are the observers’ instructions, NOT your instructions.  
 
Remember that in Part 1, all participants did a test to measure their intelligence. 
 
The participant with the lowest intelligence score and another, randomly drawn participant 
made a choice between two products, Product A and Product B. You will observe the product 
choice and portrait picture of one of these two participants. Which participant you observe is 
determined by a (virtual) coin flip: 
 
• With a probability of 50% heads comes up, and you observe the choice and the 
picture of the participant with the lowest intelligence score, 
• With a probability of 50% tails comes up, and you observe the choice and the picture 
of the other randomly selected participant. 
 
The computer will not tell you whether heads or tails came up. However, you will learn 
which product was chosen by the participant with the lowest intelligence score.  
 
Example: Suppose that the participant with the lowest intelligence score chose Product A, the 
other randomly selected participant chose Product B. If tails comes up, you would see the 
following screen: 
 
The participant with the lowest intelligence score chose Product A. 
 












The following example illustrates all three stages. This example is purely hypothetical; it is 
not based on actual choices of participants. 
 









Stage 2: You learn the choice of the participant with the lowest intelligence score. Suppose 
that you make the following choices: 
 
Case Which product do you choose for the respective case ? 
1 ● Product A + 3.00 CHF ○ Product B 
2 ● Product A + 2.50 CHF ○ Product B 
3 ● Product A + 2.00 CHF ○ Product B 
4 ○ Product A + 1.50 CHF ● Product B 
5 ○ Product A + 1.00 CHF ● Product B 
6 ○ Product A + 0.50 CHF ● Product B 
7 ○ Product A ● Product B 
8 ○ Product A ● Product B + 0.50 CHF 
9 ○ Product A ● Product B + 1.00 CHF 
10 ○ Product A ● Product B + 1.50 CHF 
11 ○ Product A ● Product B + 2.00 CHF 
12 ○ Product A ● Product B + 2.50 CHF 
13 ○ Product A ● Product B + 3.00 CHF 
  
Suppose that case 11 is the randomly drawn case; therefore, you receive Product B + 2.00 
CHF. 
 
Stage 3: Suppose that heads comes up for an observer; that is, this observer sees the choice 
and picture of the participant with the lowest intelligence score. Specifically, this observer 













Suppose that tails comes up for another observer; that is, this observer sees your choice and 












The participant with the lowest intelligence score chose Product A. 
 
 




The person on the picture choose Product B.  
Your picture 
The participant with the lowest intelligence score chose Product A. 
 
 


















Summary Part 2 
 
Here is a summary of Part 2: 
 
Stage 1. The computer picks the participant that has the lowest intelligence 
score among all participants. This participant choses between Product 
A and Product B. You learn which product he or she chose. 
Stage 2.  You choose between Product A and Product B in all 13 cases. One 
cases is then randomly drawn to be implemented, the drawn case. 
Stage 3. 14 observers learn the choice of the participant with the lowest 
intelligence score. Then, each observer either sees your choice for the 
drawn case and your picture, or the choice of the participant with the 
lowest intelligence score and his or her picture. 
 
Final remark: Part 2 is only implemented with a probability of 1/7 
 
With probability 1/7, Part 2 is implemented exactly as described; that is, you receive your 
chosen product (and the (potentially) linked monetary payment) for the drawn case, and your 
choice is revealed to the observers.  
With probability 6/7, however, Part 2 is not implemented. You neither receive your chosen 
product, nor is your choice revealed to the observers.  
 
 
If you have any questions about the instructions, please raise your hand to get assistance. 





D.1.4 Consumption choices (handout) 
	
 




In stage 2, you have to choose between the two products, Product A and Product B. You will 
see 13 cases in which you have to indicate your preferences between Product A and Product 
B. 
 
In each case, one of the products might be linked with an additional monetary payment, 




product as well as the linked amount of money. Table 1 shows you all possible combinations 
of products and monetary payments. The cases differ only in the amount of money.   
  
Case Choice  
1 Product A + 3.00 CHF or Product B 
2 Product A + 2.50 CHF or Product B 
3 Product A + 2.00 CHF or Product B 
4 Product A + 1.50 CHF or Product B 
5 Product A + 1.00 CHF or Product B 
6 Product A + 0.50 CHF or Product B 
7 Product A or Product B 
8 Product A or Product B + 0.50 CHF 
9 Product A or Product B + 1.00 CHF 
10 Product A or Product B + 1.50 CHF 
11 Product A or Product B + 2.00 CHF 
12 Product A or Product B + 2.50 CHF 
13 Product A or Product B + 3.00 CHF 
Table 1: Possible cases 
  
For example, in case 1, you have to choose between product A plus 3.00 CHF and product B 
(without an additional amount of money), while case 10 you choose between product A 
(without an additional amount of money) and product B plus 1.50 CHF. 
  
Look at Table 2. Table 2 illustrates how you will make your choice. 
  
Case Which product do you choose for the respective case ? 
1 ○ Product A + 3.00 CHF ○ Product B 
2 ○ Product A + 2.50 CHF ○ Product B 
3 ○ Product A + 2.00 CHF ○ Product B 
4 ○ Product A + 1.50 CHF ○ Product B 
5 ○ Product A + 1.00 CHF ○ Product B 
6 ○ Product A + 0.50 CHF ○ Product B 
7 ○ Product A ○ Product B 
8 ○ Product A ○ Product B + 0.50 CHF 
9 ○ Product A ○ Product B + 1.00 CHF 
10 ○ Product A ○ Product B + 1.50 CHF 
11 ○ Product A ○ Product B + 2.00 CHF 
12 ○ Product A ○ Product B + 2.50 CHF 
13 ○ Product A ○ Product B + 3.00 CHF 
Table 2: Your choice 
  
Each row in the table is one case. You must specify for each of the cases which option you 
choose. For example, in the first case, you have to specify whether you prefer product A plus 
3 CHF or product B (without an extra amount of money). If you prefer the former option, 
select “Product A + 3.00 CHF.” If you prefer the latter option, select “Product B.” 
 
For each choice situation, one of the thirteen cases will be randomly drawn to be 




your decision, however, you do not know yet which of the thirteen cases will ultimately be 
drawn. Therefore, you must specify which option you choose for each case.  
 
 
D.1.5 Consumption choices, round 2 (on screen) 
Part 3 
 
You are finished with Part 2 of the experiment. You will now start with Part 3.  
 
Part 3 is similar to Part 2. However, there are two important differences:  
 
• You observe another participant: In Part 1, all participants could increase or 
decrease a donation to Zukunft CH, a conservative Christian organization. You (and 
the observers) will learn the choice of the participant that made the highest donation 
to Zukunft CH.  
 
• Different products: You, and the participant that made the highest donation to 
Zukunft CH, choose between two new, different, products. Let us call these two 
products Product C and Product D. 
 
 
Otherwise, Part 3 is exactly the same as Part 2 and consists of the following stages: 
 
Stage 1. The computer picks the participant that made the highest donation to 
Zukunft CH among all participants. (If two or more participants made 
the highest donation, one is randomly drawn.) This participant choses 
between Product C and Product D. You learn which product he or she 
chose. 
Stage 2.  You choose between Product C and Product D in all 13 cases (as 
described in the handout “Instructions: Stage 2, your choice”). One 
case is then randomly drawn to be implemented, the drawn case. 
Stage 3. 14 observers learn the choice of the participant that made the highest 
donation to Zukunft CH. Then, each observer either sees your choice 
for the drawn case and your picture (with a probability of 50%), or the 
choice of the participant that made the highest donation to Zukunft CH 
and his or her picture (with a probability of 50%).  
 
Again, Part 3 is only implemented with a probability of 1/7.  
 
If you have any questions about the instructions, please raise your hand to get assistance. 




D.1.6 Choices are revealed to observers (on screen) 
	





The participant with the highest intelligence score and another, randomly drawn participant 
made a choice between two products, Camille Bloch chocolate and Munz chocolate. You will 
observe the product choice and portrait picture of one of these two participants. Which 
participant you observe is determined by a (virtual) coin flip: 
 
• With a probability of 50% heads comes up, and you observe the choice and the 
picture of the participant with the highest intelligence score, 
• With a probability of 50% tails comes up, and you observe the choice and the picture 
of the other randomly selected participant. 
 
The computer will not tell you whether heads or tails came up. However, you will learn 
which product was chosen by the participant with the highest intelligence score.  
 
Example: Suppose that the participant with the highest intelligence score chose the Camille 
Bloch chocolate, the other randomly selected participant chose Munz chocolate. If tails 
comes up, you would see the following screen: 
 
The participant with the highest intelligence score chose the Camille Bloch chocolate. 
 











What do you think a package of Camille Bloch 
Torino chocolate bars typically costs? If you 
correctly estimate the price, plus/minus 50 
Rappen, you will receive an additional 1 CHF. 
 
 
What do you think a package of Munz 
chocolate bars typically costs? If you correctly 
estimate the price, plus/minus 50 Rappen, you 










What do you think the cup on the picture 
typically costs? If you correctly estimate the 
price, plus/minus 50 Rappen, you will receive 
an additional 1 CHF. 
 
 
What do you think the 4GB USB stick on the 
picture typically costs? If you correctly 
estimate the price, plus/minus 50 Rappen, you 






Evaluate the four products on the following dimensions: 
 

















bars, 5 x 
23g 
 
How good is the quality of the raw materials used?  
(1 = "very low quality"; 5 = "very high quality") 
    
How well is the product processed? 
(1 = "very low quality"; 5 = "very high quality") 
    
When you think about using/eating the product, are 
you disgusted?  
(1 = "very disgusted"; 5 = "not disgusted at all") 
    
Does the producer of the good promote 
conservative Christian values (e.g, fighting 
abortions and marriage for same-sex couples)?  
(1 = "yes, strongly "; 5 = "no, not at all") 
    
How popular is the product among conservative 
Christians?  
(1 = "not popular at all"; 5 = "very popular") 
    
How popular is the product among Atheists?  
(1 = "not popular at all"; 5 = "very popular") 
    
How popular is the product among intelligent 
people?  
(1 = "not popular at all"; 5 = "very popular") 
    
How popular is the product among unintelligent 
people?  
(1 = "not popular at all"; 5 = "very popular") 





Willingness to pay to receive products in private 
 
In the first part of the questionnaire, you can make offers to buy the products from Part 2 and 
Part 3. Your task is to specify the maximum price (maximum price) you are willing to pay for 
each of the following products: 
 
The cup on this 
picture 
 
The 4GB USB stick 




chocolate bars, 5x23g 
 
Package Munz 




If you do not receive a product in Part 2 and in Part 3, one of your offers might be 
implemented: with a probability of 1/7, one of the four products is randomly drawn. In this 
case, the computer will randomly draw a price between 0 CHF and 10 CHF for this product 
(drawn price).  
- If the drawn price is lower than the maximum price you have specified for this 
product (drawn price <= maximum price), you will receive the product at the end of 
the study and the drawn price will be deducted from your payout. 
- If the drawn price is higher than the maximum price you have specified for this 
product (drawn price > maximum price), you do not buy the product, that is, you will 
not receive the product and no money will be deducted from your payout.  
This procedure ensures that it is in your best interest to specify exactly the price that you 
maximally want to pay for the product. 
 
When specifying the prices, keep in mind that:  
• your earnings will be paid out anonymously at the end of the study. Therefore, no 
other participant will observe what product you bought in this part. 
• your choice can only be implemented if you do not receive a product in Part 2 and in 
Part 3. Therefore, you should specify how much you are maximally willing to pay for 
getting a first product, not how much you are maximally willing to pay for getting a 
second product. 
 
What is the maximum price (maximum price) that you are willing to pay for the products: 
Cup ______  
4GB USB stick ______ 
Package Camille Bloch Torino chocolate bars ______ 
Package Munz chocolate bars ______ 
 
Importance of intelligence and moral values 
• How important is it for you that other people do not think that you are unintelligent? 
• How important is it for you that other people think that you are intelligent? 
• How important is it for your self-esteem to be intelligent? 





• How important is it for you that other people think that you are tolerant towards 
homosexuality? 
• How important is it for your self-esteem to be tolerant towards homosexuality? 
 




• Gender (male, female) 
• Age (input field) 
• At which Institution do you study? (University of Zurich (UZH), ETH, Other 
University, University of Applied Science, No university) 
• Field of study (input field) 
• Nationality (or, nationalities) (input field) 
• Religion (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hindu, Buddhism, Bahai, no religion, atheism, 
other) 








D.2 Instructions Study 2 
 
All instructions from Study 2 are translated from German. 
 
D.2.1 Instructions (Handout) 
	
 





According to the scientific standards of the Laboratory for Behavioral and Experimental 
Economics, we are not allowed to lie to you or mislead you at any time. All the information 
gathered in this experiment is kept strictly anonymous and will never be associated with your 
name. 
 
In the study you have to choose between two products. Note that this study part of an 




Please do not talk to other participants and do not use your mobile phone throughout the 
study. If you violate these rules, we have to exclude you from the study and cannot pay you. 
  
Questions 
If you have questions at any time during the study, please raise your hand. We will come to 
your place and answer your questions individually. 
  
Payment 
You will receive a fixed payment of CHF 15 for participation. You will earn additional 
money during the experiment, and you will receive a real product that you will select during 
the experiment. Your earnings will be paid out anonymously and in cash at the end of the 
study. 
  
Anonymity: your ID number 
At the end of the study, you will be paid out based on your ID number (in the envelope). 
During the study, you will be asked to open the envelope and enter the ID number in the 
computer terminal. At the end of the study, the experimenter will place each participant’s 
payment (including the selected product) in an envelope labeled only with the participant’s 
anonymous ID number and will close the envelope. The “monitor” (a randomly drawn 
participant) will then distribute the envelopes to the consumers based one their ID numbers. 
Since the experimenter does not know which participant has which ID number, he can not 
associate payments with specific participants. Since the monitor does not know the contents 
of the envelopes, he/she can not associate the participants with a specific payment. 
  
The monitor was randomly drawn at the beginning of the experiment to ensure anonymity. 
He/she does not participate in the study. Note that this procedure ensures that the 









The study takes 60 minutes and consists of 4 parts: 
  
Part 1.  You participate in a test that measures implicit associations (the 
implicit association test). 
Part 2. In a small, previous study, a total of 10 participants had to choose 
between two products, product A and product B. In Part 2, we will 
inform you about the demographics and choices of these participants. 
Part 3.  You choose between product A and product B. 
Part 4. You answer a questionnaire. 
  








Part 1 : The Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
  
  
In the first part of this study, your implicit attitudes regarding racism are measured with the 
implicit association test (IAT). 
The following description of the IAT is largely based on that of the “Project Implicit” of the 
Harvard University. Project Implicit is a non-profit organization that aims to educate the 
public about hidden, implicit prejudices. 
 
What is the implicit association test? 
The implicit association test (IAT) is a method of measuring implicit attitudes, such as 
implicit racism (against people with another skin color, as well as people with a migration 
background). Developed in 1998 by the social psychologists Greenwald, McGhee and 
Schwart43, it is nowadays widely used in the social sciences (in psychology, economics, 
political science, and sociology). Gawronsky and Conrey (2004)44 write: “In the history of 
psychology, probably no other procedure has received as much attention in such a short time 
as the implicit association test.” 
  
What are implicit attitudes regarding racism? 
People often fail to correctly indicate their attitudes towards certain groups of people, such as 
people with a dark skin color, because they are unaware of their true attitudes. For example, 
individuals with racial prejudice tend to hide their true attitudes from themselves (self-
deception) in order to maintain a good self-image. 
These true, hidden attitudes are called “implicit associations.” The IAT is a method for 
measuring these implicit attitudes. 
  
How does the IAT measure implicit settings? 
In the IAT that is used in today’s study, participant have to repeatedly associate images of 
people with light or dark skin color with positive (e.g., happy, peace, love) or negative 
attributes (e.g., failure, evil, cruel). This task has to be done under time pressure. 
For a person with negative implicit attitudes toward dark-skinned people it is difficult to 
associate a dark skin tone with positive attributes. This is reflected in response times: the 
person requires more time to connect a picture of a person with dark skin with positive 
attributes than with negative attributes. However, if a person does not associate the dark skin 
tone with negative attributes, there will be no difference in response times. 
Thus, the IAT uses response time to measure implicit associations: the stronger the 
association, the shorter the response time. 
  
																																																								
43 Greenwald, AG, McGhee, D., and Schwartz, J. (1998) "Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association 
test," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74: 1464-1480. 
44 Gawronski , B. and Conrey , FR (2004) "The Implicit Association Test as a Measure of Automatically Activated Associations," 




Significance of the IAT 
Studies show that implicit associations (measured with the IAT) are associated with racist 
behavior. People who have negative implicit associations to a group avoid members of that 
group and treat them worse.45 Managers with negative implicit associations discriminate 
people with migration background in hiring decisions46 and promote them less often47. Such 
discriminatory behavior has also been found among doctors48, teachers49 and students50 with 
negative implicit associations.  
  
In the first part of today’s study, you participate in such an implicit association test. You will 
see the result of your test. However, the result will not be saved. This means that you are the 




45 McConnell, AR, and Leibold , JM (2001) "Relations among the implicit association test, discriminatory behavior, and explicit measures 
of racial attitudes," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37: 435-442. 
46 Rooth , D. (2010). "Automatic associations and discrimination in hiring: Real-world evidence." Labor Economics, 17: 523-534. 
47 Glover, D., Pallais , A., and Pariente , W. (2017) "Discrimination as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from French Grocery Stores," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132 (3): 1219-1260. 
48 Green, AR, Carney, DR, Pallin , D., Iezzoni , L., and Banaji , M. (2007). "Implicit bias among physicians and its prediction of 
thrombolysis decisions for Black and White patients," Journal of General Internal Medicine: 22, 1231-1238. 
49 Carlan , M. (2018) "Implicit Stereotypes: Evidence from Teachers' Gender Bias," working paper. 















One of the products might be linked with an additional monetary payment, between CHF 
0.50 and CHF 3.00. If you choose this product, you will receive both the product as well as 
the linked amount of money. Table 1 shows you all possible combinations of products and 
monetary payments. One of the thirteen cases will be randomly drawn to be implemented. 
Every case is drawn with the same probability. 
 
  
Case Choice situation 
1 Product A + 3.00 CHF or Product B 
2 Product A + 2.50 CHF or Product B 
3 Product A + 2.00 CHF or Product B 
4 Product A + 1.50 CHF or Product B 
5 Product A + 1.00 CHF or Product B 
6 Product A + 0.50 CHF or Product B 
7 Product A or Product B 
8 Product A or Product B + 0.50 CHF 
9 Product A or Product B + 1.00 CHF 
10 Product A or Product B + 1.50 CHF 
11 Product A or Product B + 2.00 CHF 
12 Product A or Product B + 2.50 CHF 
13 Product A or Product B + 3.00 CHF 
Table 1: Possible cases 
  
The cases differ only in the amount of money. For example, if case 1 is drawn, you have to 
choose between product A plus 3.00 CHF and product B (without an additional amount of 
money). If case 10 is drawn, you choose between product A (without an additional amount of 
money) and product B plus 1.50 CHF. 
 
At the time of your decision, however, you do not know yet which of the thirteen cases will 
ultimately be drawn. Therefore, you must specify which option you choose for each case. At 
the end of the study, one case will be randomly drawn to be implemented, the drawn case. 
You will receive the option you selected in this case, that is, the corresponding product and 
the (possibly) associated amount of money. 
  







Case Which product do you choose for the respective case ? 
1 ○ Product A + 3.00 CHF ○ Product B 
2 ○ Product A + 2.50 CHF ○ Product B 
3 ○ Product A + 2.00 CHF ○ Product B 
4 ○ Product A + 1.50 CHF ○ Product B 
5 ○ Product A + 1.00 CHF ○ Product B 
6 ○ Product A + 0.50 CHF ○ Product B 
7 ○ Product A ○ Product B 
8 ○ Product A ○ Product B + 0.50 CHF 
9 ○ Product A ○ Product B + 1.00 CHF 
10 ○ Product A ○ Product B + 1.50 CHF 
11 ○ Product A ○ Product B + 2.00 CHF 
12 ○ Product A ○ Product B + 2.50 CHF 
13 ○ Product A ○ Product B + 3.00 CHF 
Table 2: Your choice 
  
Each row in the table is one case. You must specify for each of the cases which option you 
choose. For example, in the first case, you have to specify whether you prefer product A plus 
3 CHF or product B (without an extra amount of money). If you prefer the former option, 




At the end of the study, one of the thirteen cases will be randomly drawn (the drawn case) 
and you will receive the option you have chosen in this case. 
 
 
If you have questions, please raise your hand. Otherwise, press the OK button on the screen 
and answer the comprehension questions on the computer. After you have answered the 
comprehension questions, you will be asked to enter your ID number. 
 
D.2.2 Targets’ choices are revealed (on screen) 
As announced, 10 participants from a previous study chose between two products. 
 
These participants are neo-Nazis. The neo-Nazis were recruited on the right-wing extremist 
websites ………….…. and ………………………..….. The neo-Nazis chose between 
products A and B. The chosen product was delivered to the participants while maintaining 
their anonymity. 
 
[Neutral treatment: These participants were recruited on the internet and chose between 
products A and B. The chosen product was delivered to the participants.] 
 
• 70 percent of participants are men. 




• Eighty percent of participants have completed at most upper secondary education. 
 
The 10 participants chose between the following products: 
 
Pack Camille Bloch Torino 
5 x 23g (Art. Nr. 3000652) 
 
Pack Munz Praliné-Prügeli Milch 
5 x 23g (Art. Nr. 3928213) 
 
 
Result: 9 out of 10 neo-Nazis [Neutral treatment: participants] chose Munz Praliné-
Prügeli Milch.  
 
	
D.2.3 Questionnaire (on screen) 
 
Perception 1 
• What do you think, how much does a pack of Camille Bloch Torino chocolate bars 
currently cost at Migros? If you correctly estimate the price, plus / minus 50 cents, 
you will receive an additional CHF 1. 
• What do you think, how much does a pack of Munz Praliné-Prügeli chocolate bars 
currently cost at Coop? If you correctly estimate the price, plus / minus 50 cents, you 
will receive an additional CHF 1. 
 
Perception 2 




 “How healthy are the products?”  
(1 = "very unhealthy"; 5 = "very healthy") 
  
 „How long can you store the products?“  
(1 = "  spoils soon "; 5 = "long storage life") 
  
 „	How good is the quality of the raw materials used?” (1 = "very 
low quality"; 5 = "very high quality") 
  
 „How sustainable are the raw materials used?” (1 = "very 
sustainable"; 5 = "not sustainable at all") 
  
“What is the quality of the processing?” (1 = "very low quality"; 
5 = "very high quality") 
  
„When you think about eating the Camille Bloch (Munz) 
chocolate, are you disgusted?“  





“If you were to eat the chocolate in public, would people 
associate you with right-wing extremism?” (1 = "Yes, for sure"; 5 
= "No, certainly not") 
  
“If you were to eat the chocolate in front of your family or 
friends, would you associate it with right-wing extremism?”  




• What do you think, does Camille Bloch in any way promote right-wing extremism 
(for example, through party donations, employment of right-wing extremists, public 
support for right-wing extremist ideals)? 
• What do you think, does Munz in any way promote right-wing extremism (for 
example, through party donations, employment of right-wing extremists, public 
support for right-wing extremist ideals)?  
• “What do you think, does Camille Bloch in any way discriminate against minorities 
(for example, in the recruitment, payment or promotion of employees)?”  
• “What do you think, does Munz in any way discriminate against minorities (for 
example, in the recruitment, payment or promotion of employees)?”  






Do you know the chocolate well (for example, do you buy the 
chocolate regularly, or did you buy it regularly in the past)?  
o yes   o no o yes   o no 
Can you eat the chocolate (or are you, for example, allergic to 
certain ingredients)?   
o yes   o no o yes   o no 
If you would receive the chocolate at the end of the study, 
would you eat some of it yourself? 
o yes   o no o yes   o no 
If you would receive the chocolate at the end of the study, 
would you give the entire pack to another person? 
o yes   o no o yes   o no 
If you would receive the chocolate at the end of the study, 
would you throw it away? 
o yes   o no o yes   o no 
 
Implicit association test 
• Did your results in the implicit association test unsettle you in that you might be 
prejudiced? (“Yes, the results unsettled me very much,” “Yes, the results unsettled 
me,” “Yes, the results unsettled me a little bit,” “No, the results did not unsettled me”) 
• Did you know the implicit association test before participating in this study? (“Yes” 
or “No”) 
• Have you participated in an implicit association test before participating in this study? 
(“Yes” or “No”) 
• Have you participated in an implicit association test on racism before participating in 






What do you think, what proportion of other participants in today’s study chose the Camille 
Bloch Torriono chocolate? 
 
The other participants were in exactly the same choice situation as you. Please estimate the 
proportion for each of the 13 cases. At the end of the study, one of the 13 cases will be 
randomly drawn. If you have correctly estimated the share for the drawn case, you will 
receive an additional CHF 5. 
 
Case Choice situation Share that chose Camille Bloch Torriono 
1 Product A + 3.00 CHF   o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
2 Product A + 2.50 CHF or Product B  o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
3 Product A + 2.00 CHF or Product B  o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
4 Product A + 1.50 CHF or Product B  o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
5 Product A + 1.00 CHF or Product B  o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
6 Product A + 0.50 CHF or Product B  o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
7 Product A or Product B o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
8 Product A or Product B + 0.50 CHF o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
9 Product A or Product B + 1.00 CHF o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
10 Product A or Product B + 1.50 CHF o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
11 Product A or Product B + 2.00 CHF o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
12 Product A or Product B + 2.50 CHF o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
13 Product A or Product B + 3.00 CHF o 0-10%  o 11-20%  o 21-30%  o 31-40%  o 41-50%  o 51-60%  o 
61-70%  o 71-80%  o 81-90%  o 91-100% 
 
Beliefs 2 
• What do you think, if 100 randomly selected students were asked if they prefer the 
Camille Bloch Torino chocolate bars or the Munz Praliné Prügeli, how many would 
choose the Camille Bloch Torino chocolate bars? 
• What do you think, if 100 randomly selected managers were asked if they prefer the 
Camille Bloch Torino chocolate bars or the Munz Praliné Prügeli, how many would 
choose the Camille Bloch Torino chocolate bars? 
• What do you think, if 100 randomly selected construction workers were asked if they 
prefer the Camille Bloch Torino chocolate bars or the Munz Praliné Prügeli, how 
many would choose the Camille Bloch Torino chocolate bars? 
• What do you think, if 100 randomly selected left-wing extremist were asked if they 
prefer the Camille Bloch Torino chocolate bars or the Munz Praliné Prügeli, how 
many would choose the Camille Bloch Torino chocolate bars? 
• What do you think, if 100 randomly selected neo-Nazis were asked if they prefer the 
Camille Bloch Torino chocolate bars or the Munz Praliné Prügeli, how many would 
choose the Camille Bloch Torino chocolate bars? 
 




In the next two parts of the survey, you can buy products. Your task is to specify the 
maximum price you are willing to pay for the product.  
 
After you have specified the price, the computer will randomly draw a price between CHF 0 
and CHF 6 in CHF 0.05 increments (drawn price).  
- If the drawn price is lower than the maximum price that you have specified (drawn 
price <= maximum price), you will receive the product at the end of the study and the 
drawn price will be deducted from your payout. 
- If the drawn price is higher than the maximum price that you have specified (drawn 
price> maximum price), you do not buy the product. You will not receive the product 
and no amount will be deducted from your payout.  
This procedure implies that it is in your best interest to specify the price that you want to pay 
for the product as the maximum price. 
 
Chocolate preferences 
The first product is a package (5 x 27g) "Classic Branches" chocolate from Frey 
Chocolat. 
 
What is the maximum price (maximum price) you are willing to pay for this product? 
 
(Input field, any number in [0, 6.00] CHF) 
 
Experimenter demand 
The second product is a Kingston 16 GB USB flash drive (USB 3). 
 
[Experimenter demand treatment: We expect that participants who are shown these 
instructions will specify a lower maximum price than they normally would.] 
 
What is the maximum price (maximum price) you are willing to pay for this product? 
(Input field, any number in [0, 6.00] CHF) 
 
Political position 
Please indicate your political position (Seven-level Likert scale  from 1 = "very left-wing" to 
7 = "very righ-wing") 
 
Please tick all parties whose party program appeals to you (you can choose several options): 
Alternative Linke (AL), Auto-Partei (AP), Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei (BDP), 
Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP), Christlichsoziale Partei Obwalden (CSP), 
Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union (EDU), Evangelische Volkspartei (EVP), FDP.Die 
Liberalen (FDP), Grüne Partei der Schweiz (GPS), Grünliberale Partei (GLP), Lega dei 
Ticinesi (Lega), Mouvement citoyens romands/genevois (MCR/MCG), Partei der Arbeit der 
Schweiz (PdA/POP), Partei National Orientierter Schweizer (PNOS), Schweizer Demokraten 
(SD), Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP), Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (SP) 
 
Racism 
Please rate the following statements:  
• I support the integration of immigrants  
• If a black family with about the same income and education as I have moved next 




• It is easy to understand the anger of Turks living in Germany due to racism. 
• Refugees receive more than they deserve in Switzerland. 
• The media put immigrants and refugees in too positive a light. 
• Discrimination against people with a migrant background is a big problem in Europe. 
• Immigration is a big problem in Europe. 
Seven-level Likert scale (1 = "strongly agree"; 7 = "strongly disagree") 
 
(Notes: Items based on the Old-Fashioned and Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986)51, 
adapted to the Swiss context) 
 
Right-wing and left-wing extremism 
Please rate the following statements:  
• In the national interest, a dictatorship is the better form of government under certain 
circumstances. 
• National states should be abolished. 
• Capitalism ultimately leads to fascism. 
• The crimes of National Socialism have been greatly exaggerated in historiography. 
• A decent life is only possible in socialism/communism. 
• Jews, more than other people, use evil tricks to achieve what they want. 
Seven-level Likert scale (1 = "strongly agree"; 7 = "strongly disagree") 
 




• I might be willing to try eating monkey meat, under some circumstance. (“Yes” or 
“No”) 
• It bothers me to see someone in a restaurant eating messy food with his fingers. 
(“Yes” or “No”) 
• You see someone put ketchup on vanilla ice cream, and eat it. How do you feel? 
(Five-level Likert scale from 1 = "very disgusted" to 5 = " not disgusted at all") 
• You are about to drink a glass of milk when you smell that it is spoiled. How do you 
feel? (Five-level Likert scale from 1 = "very disgusted" to 5 = " not disgusted at all") 
(Note: taken from Haidt, McCauley and Rozin, 199454) 
 
Image concerns 
The following statements concern prejudices against persons with a migration background.  
 
Please rate the following statements:  
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• In today's society it is important that one not be perceived as prejudiced in any 
manner. 
• Being nonprejudiced is important to my self-concept  
• It is important to me that other people not think I am prejudiced.  
• I feel guilty when I have negative thoughts or feelings about a person with migration 
background 
• I get angry with myself when I have thoughts that are prejudiced.  
• If I have a prejudiced thought or feeling, I keep it to myself.  
• When speaking to a person with a migration background, it's important to me that 
he/she does not think I am prejudiced. 
• It is important to me to act in nonprejudiced ways 
Seven-level Likert scale (1 = "strongly agree"; 7 = "strongly disagree") 
(Note: items adapted from Dunton and Fazio, 199755 and Plant and Devine, 199856) 
 
Products preferences for products related to right-wing extremism 
• Do you own Lonsdale products? (“Yes” or “No”) 
• Do you own Fred Perry products? (“Yes” or “No”) 
• Do you own Dr. Martens products? (“Yes” or “No”)  
• Do you think there are Lonsdale cloths that you might like?  (Five-level Likert scale 
from 1 = " Yes, for sure" to 5 = " No, certainly not") 
• If there was a fashion piece from Lonsdale that appeals to you, would you buy it? The 
brand is easily recognizable from the outside. (Five-level Likert scale from 1 = " Yes, 
for sure" to 5 = " No, certainly not") 
• If there was a fashion piece from Lonsdale that appeals to you, would you buy it? The 
brand is not recognizable from the outside. (Five-level Likert scale from 1 = " Yes, 
for sure" to 5 = " No, certainly not") 
Demographics 
• What is your highest degree? (Secundary school, Bachelor, Master, PhD, Other) 
• What is your field of study? (Input field) 
• Citizenship(s) (Input field) 
• Gender (male, female) 
• Age (Input field) 
• Which religion do you belong to? (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hindu, Buddhism, 
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